ARTICLE

POLICING AS ADMINISTRATION

CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN†
Police agencies should be governed by the same administrative principles that
govern other agencies. This simple precept would have significant implications for
regulation of police work, in particular the type of suspicionless, group searches and
seizures that have been the subject of the Supreme Court’s special needs jurisprudence
(practices that this Article calls “panvasive”). Under administrative law principles,
when police agencies create statute-like policies that are aimed at largely innocent
categories of actors—as they do when administering roadblocks, inspection regimes,
drug testing programs, DNA sampling programs, and data collection—they should
have to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking or a similar democratically
oriented process and avoid arbitrary and capricious rules. Courts would have the
authority to ensure that policies governing panvasive actions are authorized by statute
and implemented evenhandedly, both in individual instances and as they are
distributed within the agency’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, these principles would apply
regardless of whether the panvasive practice has been designated a search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement agencies can be
divided into two types: “suspicion-based” and “panvasive.”1 Most police efforts
to detect and deter crime involve a decision about whether to seize a particular
person or search his or her possessions, based on “probable cause” or “reasonable
suspicion.”2 The officer in the field determines whether the confrontation takes
place, the unit of investigation is usually no more than a few individuals, and
the motivation behind the police action is suspicion of crime.

1 See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for
Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 286 (2016) (“When policing agencies police, they do one of
two things: (1) they investigate, and (2) they seek, in a programmatic or regulatory way, to curb a
social problem.”).
2 See DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 16, 25-26 (1994) (noting that most
policing involves either “patrol” or detective work and stating that both are “overwhelmingly
reactive”). I include in this category suspicionless actions incident to arrest, stop, or search because
they immediately follow suspicion-based actions. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
224 (1973) (discussing the officer’s ability to search an arrestee or his vicinity simply by virtue of the
person having been placed under arrest).
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Panvasive searches and seizures, which have also been called dragnets3 and
programmatic searches and seizures,4 are something quite different.5 These
police actions usually share three characteristics: (1) they occur pursuant to a
legislative or executive branch policy, written or unwritten, that officers are
directed to follow; (2) they seek to ferret out or deter undetected wrongdoing,
usually within a designated group, rather than focus on a particular crime known
to have already occurred; and, relatedly, (3) they are purposefully suspicionless
with respect to any particular individual, and thus will almost inevitably affect
a significant number of people not involved in wrongdoing.6 Examples of
panvasive actions include residential and business inspection programs,
checkpoints (aimed at detecting, inter alia, illegal immigration, drunken
drivers, or drivers without licenses), drug testing programs, creation of DNA
databases, collection of communications metadata, and establishment of
surveillance regimes involving cameras, tracking systems, and the like.7
Although all of these investigative techniques involve searching for and
seizing items or people, not all of these techniques (for instance, metadata
collection and public camera surveillance) are considered searches or seizures

3 I have used this term in previous work. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2010). However, for reasons indicated below at note 5, I have since
used the panvasive nomenclature.
4 See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1039, 1042 (2016) (distinguishing “programmatic surveillance” from “transactional” search-by-search
analysis); see also Friedman & Stein, supra note 1, at 286.
5 I use the word “panvasive” to describe these actions because they are pervasive, invasive, and
affect large numbers of people, most of whom police know are innocent of wrongdoing. See
Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, 82 MISS. L.J. 307, 308 (2013) (“Although
these techniques are now pervasive, and are often invasive, their defining characteristic is their
panvasiveness—the fact that they affect so many people, most of them innocent of any
wrongdoing.”). The term “dragnet” is less apt because it has generally been applied solely to
detentions in connection with solving a particular crime, and thus includes neither searches nor
preventive actions. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728-29 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(referring to the detention of twenty-four black youths for fingerprinting purposes as a “dragnet
procedure[]”). The word “programmatic” is also misleading, because suspicion-based searches and
seizures can also be part of a program. See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168-69 (2015)
(describing New York City’s recently suspended stop-and-frisk policy, which ostensibly required
reasonable suspicion before a stop could occur, as a “program”).
6 Note, however, that panvasive searches and seizures could be based on data that suggest a
particular type of location or activity is likely to be associated with the crime or crimes of interest
and thus could sometimes be said to be based on what I have called “generalized suspicion.”
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57 (1991); cf.
Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 809, 846-50 (2011) (arguing that “hit rates,” predicted beforehand or obtained after a
government action, can provide the “suspicion” needed to make a search or seizure reasonable).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 24–96.
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under the Fourth Amendment.8 When the courts do find that a particular
investigation program is a search or a seizure, they usually conclude that the
government interest in the program outweighs its intrusiveness, often using
what has come to be called “special needs” analysis, on the theory that these
situations are outside the typical bailiwick of the police.9 Thus, the Supreme
Court has upheld, against Fourth Amendment challenge, suspicionless
inspections of gun stores, liquor stores, mining operations, and junkyards,
suspicionless stops at border and sobriety checkpoints, suspicionless drug
testing of government officials, railway workers, and school children, and
suspicionless DNA sampling of arrestees, and lower courts have upheld
suspicionless operation of counterterrorist checkpoints, metadata programs,
and camera surveillance systems.10
These decisions have been controversial and are currently in a state of
flux. Some scholars would impose the traditional suspicion-based warrant
regime in many of these situations,11 or would preclude prosecutorial use of
any evidence thereby obtained,12 whereas others agree with the Court’s
8 The constitutional test is whether the police action (1) infringes reasonable expectations of
privacy or (2) involves a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space. See United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012) (identifying the “reasonable expectation of privacy” and
“common-law trespass” formulas as the tests for when the Fourth Amendment applies). The
Supreme Court’s “third party” doctrine holds that a person has no expectation of privacy when he
or she voluntarily surrenders information to a third party, whether it be a bank, phone company, or
internet service provider. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to
a third party . . . .”). The Supreme Court has also held that surveillance of public activities is not a
search, so long as that surveillance is not prolonged. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281
(1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges
on expectations of privacy.”).
9 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“[W]e have upheld certain
regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to serve special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10 See infra Sections I.A–F.
11 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 93-144 (2012) (disagreeing with most of the
Court’s special needs cases); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating
the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 522-23 (1991) (arguing that suspicionless searches
should be permitted only in cases involving extreme exigency or presenting “the most minimal
potential for abuse and unnecessary intrusion”); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25-32 (1994) (criticizing the suggestion
that probable cause should not be required for all government intrusions, including surveillance).
12 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59
DUKE L.J. 843, 920-21 (2010) (arguing that when government purports to be carrying out
“regulatory” searches and seizures, as is the case with many special needs situations, it should be
prohibited from using any evidence it garners in criminal prosecutions); see also Ricardo J. Bascuas,
Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless
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intuition that balancing is required, but would require a much weightier,
“compelling” government interest before upholding a panvasive action.13 The
Court itself has begun to backtrack from its early decisions narrowly
construing the Fourth Amendment’s threshold.14 And just last Term, in City
of Los Angeles v. Patel, the Court signaled that it may also rethink its highly
deferential special needs jurisprudence.15
The time for rethinking is at hand. But the template should be neither
traditional Fourth Amendment law nor strict scrutiny analysis. In fact,
constitutional law should largely be beside the point in this setting,
functioning only as a backstop protection for fundamental liberties and as an
exhortation that panvasive actions be reasonable. Instead, the concrete rules
governing panvasive techniques should be viewed through the entirely
different prism of administrative law.
The reason administrative law should be the primary mechanism in this
setting is simple: police departments are agencies, and as such should have to
abide by the same constraints that govern other agencies. Although scholars
from as long ago as the 1970s have recognized that administrative law can be
a useful means of regulating the police,16 and a few scholars have recently
rejuvenated this idea,17 none have provided a convincing rationale for why the
administrative template is required in this setting or fleshed out in any detail
how it might work.
Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 781 (2007) (noting that “‘special needs’ searches are more easily
tolerated if they do not result in criminal penalties”).
13 See infra note 119.
14 In United States v. Jones, five Justices signaled a willingness to hold that prolonged public
tracking, whether or not accompanied by a trespass, is a search. See 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”); id. at 964
(Alito, J., concurring) (writing on behalf of himself and three other Justices that “the use of longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy”); see
also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (2013) (holding that a dog sniff of a home from curtilage
is a search).
15 See 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452-53 (2015) (holding that, although special needs analysis applied, a
hotel owner is entitled to have a neutral decisionmaker review a demand to search the hotel’s registry
before he can be penalized for failing to comply).
16 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
423 (1974) (“[I]nformed authorities today agree with rare unanimity upon the need to direct and
confine police discretion by the same process of rulemaking that has worked excellently to hold
various other forms of public agencies [accountable] under standards of lawfulness, fairness and
efficiency.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703, 725
(1974) (“My central idea is that police practices should no longer be exempt from the kind of judicial
review that is usual for other administrative agencies.”); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police,
70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 690 (1972) (touting police department rulemaking because “direct discipline
imposed by the police internally is far more likely to deter than remote exclusions of evidence in
criminal trials”).
17 See infra Section II.C.
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The myopia on the part of most of the academy and the courts results in
part from the understandable belief that the Fourth Amendment, as a
practical matter, has preempted the field of police regulation. But it also
derives from the fact that the usual starting point of analysis conceives of
police work as a suspicion-based endeavor. An officer’s decision to stop, arrest,
or search someone is typically thought of as an individualized assessment, and
most Fourth Amendment cases have in fact involved just such a search or
seizure. In administrative law parlance, the suspicion-based model of policing
could be characterized as a form of “adjudication” by the officer on the street,
and thus not amenable to the administrative regulatory mechanisms that
focus on legislative-like “rulemaking.”18 In a suspicion-based regime, to the
extent legislative pronouncements are relevant at all, the governing rules
come from the criminal law; law enforcement officials who act based on
suspicion are engaged in determining when a person may have violated a
criminal statute.
By contrast, when police instead carry out searches and seizures that are
panvasive in nature, they are not adjudicating whether the people who are
stopped or searched violated a criminal or regulatory prohibition enacted by
the legislature. Rather, they are enforcing a rule, often adopted by the police
themselves, that purposefully impedes perfectly innocent activity, such as
driving on the roads, going to school, or relying on common carriers to
communicate. Like Environmental Protection Agency rules requiring
pollution-reduction regimens or Food and Drug Administration rules
mandating certain types of food processing, panvasive actions by the police
impose conditions on everyday, legitimate conduct of potentially huge numbers
of people, enforced by coercive measures or avoidable only by changing that
conduct. Because, as explained earlier, panvasive searches and seizures are
policy-driven, group-based, and suspicionless, they are legislative in nature.
They are carried out in aid of a generally applicable regime that, if
promulgated by any other executive agency, would be considered a form of
rule governed by administrative law principles.
That conclusion has significant regulatory implications. For instance, it
means that panvasive actions have to be legislatively authorized. It triggers
notice-and-comment or analogous procedures that ensure public input into
police rulemaking. And it occasions “hard look” judicial review19 of both the
18 See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:2, at 4 (2d ed. 1979)
(“[R]ulemaking is the part of the administrative process that resembles a legislature’s enactment of
a statute . . . and adjudication is the part of the administrative process that resembles a court’s
decision of a case.”).
19 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the “Hard Look” Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 151,
154-59 (2006) (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and associated case law establishing the
hard look doctrine).
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substance of police agency regulations and the process by which they are
created. While that review does not amount to strict scrutiny, it requires
meeting more than the minimal rationality standard that the Supreme Court
usually applies to panvasive searches and seizures.20 Furthermore, the hard
look standard applies regardless of whether the government program is
designated a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure.”
A reorientation of panvasive search and seizure jurisprudence toward
administrative law principles stakes out a middle position that many of those
involved in the debate about panvasive actions might find palatable. Critics
of the Court and of current ways of policing might welcome the greater
emphasis on the rule of law, public input, and judicial rationality-with-bite
review, as well as the fact that these constraints do not depend on the Court’s
definition of the Fourth Amendment’s threshold. At the same time, a
reframing of panvasive searches and seizures as administrative actions gives
significant weight to legislative and executive decisionmaking, and it draws
from the Court’s precedent, such as it is.
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of the relevant case law on
panvasive searches and seizures, with an emphasis on the Supreme Court’s
treatment of inspections, checkpoints, drug testing programs, and DNA
sampling, as well as lower court cases concerning surveillance. Part II points
out the internal inconsistencies of the Court’s jurisprudence—in particular,
the peculiar implications of its special needs analysis—and also critiques the
most prominent alternatives suggested by commentators, the strict scrutiny
model and the “new administrativist” model. Part III then argues, based in
part on the premise that all public officials must be subject to administrative
law, in part on widely ignored aspects of the Supreme Court’s inspection
cases, and in part on the structure of panvasive search and seizure itself, that
administrative law principles should be the primary means of curbing
government discretion in this setting. Using examples from the surveillance
and street policing contexts, Part IV fleshes out how these principles would
apply: to be legitimate, panvasive actions would require authorizing legislation,
policymaking procedures that involve community input, a written product
with a written rationale, and strictures on implementation to ensure even
application both across jurisdictions and within a particular application of the
program. It also explains why these principles should apply even to local
policing efforts that usually are thought to be exempt from federal and state
administrative procedure statutes. If followed, these constraints would
provide a robust regulatory structure even if the Fourth Amendment does not

20 See id. at 156 (defining one principal element of the hard look standard as “the requirement
that the agency’s ultimate policy choice be reasonable, not just minimally rational”).
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apply to panvasive actions or applies only in the very deferential manner
contemplated by special needs analysis.
I. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has decided over twenty cases involving panvasive
searches and seizures as defined in this Article, the first in 1973 and the most
recent in 2015. In most of these cases, the Court has employed a straightforward
balancing analysis that weighs the government’s interests against the
individual’s, and then has either upheld the program or modified it in only a
minimal fashion. In a few cases, it has declared the program unconstitutional
and imposed a suspicion-based regime instead. The dividing line usually
depends on whether the Court views the situation as one involving “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [that] make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”21 This language first
appeared in a 1985 case (ironically, one that did not involve a panvasive search
or seizure22), but the Court has since used it in referring to pre-1985 panvasive
cases as well.23
The discussion below is organized under the five major types of panvasive
actions that have occupied the courts to date—inspections, checkpoints, drug
testing, DNA sampling, and mass surveillance. It does not cover the cases in
detail but rather focuses on the Court’s themes. In particular, it emphasizes
the ways the Court has tried or failed to cabin executive discretion.
A. Inspections
The leading case on panvasive searches and seizures is Camara v.
Municipal Court, involving a warrantless health and safety inspection of a
residence.24 The Court held that when such an inspection is nonconsensual,
it requires a warrant, but one founded on a type of “probable cause” quite
different from its normal definition: rather than requiring probable cause to
21 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). This language has
since found its way into numerous other opinions, whether they involve panvasive actions, see
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (upholding drug testing of athletes), or
suspicion-based actions, see City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010) (upholding a search
of an employee’s text messages). The special needs moniker has thus done double-duty. See Eve
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 259 (2011) (“[M]y
central argument is that much of the mischief in administrative search law can be traced to the Supreme
Court’s conflation of two distinct types of searches within one doctrinal exception . . . ‘dragnet searches’
and ‘special subpopulation searches.’”).
22 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (joining in an opinion upholding a
search of a student’s purse by school officials).
23 See infra text accompanying note 38.
24 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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believe a particular home is violating municipal codes, issuance of an
inspection warrant may be “based upon the passage of time, the nature of the
building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire
area,” and “will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the
condition of the particular dwelling.”25 In other words, this type of search may
be suspicionless, so long as it is based on a preexisting inspection plan relying
on neutral criteria. In permitting this departure from the suspicion-based
model, the Court found that the invasiveness of a home inspection is minimal,
indeed often welcomed by the homeowner, and is outweighed by the
government’s goal of ensuring area-wide health and safety.26 Implicit in the
Court’s holding was the conclusion that this goal could not be achieved if the
traditional probable cause requirement were applied in this setting.
In a companion case, See v. City of Seattle, the Court held that businesses
may be subject to similar suspicionless code inspections, as long as they occur
“within the framework of a warrant procedure” like that approved in
Camara.27 Ten years later, in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Court applied the
same approach to inspections under the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act.28 Again, while a warrant was needed for nonconsensual entry, it
could be based on “a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the
Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of
employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired
frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area.”29
The Court has done away with even this diluted warrant requirement in
cases involving “pervasively regulated” industries.30 Asserting that company
owners who choose to be involved in such industries are on notice that they
will be entitled to relatively little privacy from government monitoring,31 the
Court has upheld warrantless nonconsensual inspections in cases involving

25
26

Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
See id. at 537 (“First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance.
Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is
doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. . . . Finally, because
the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they
involve a relatively limited invasion of . . . privacy.” (citation omitted)).
27 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967).
28 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
29 Id. at 321.
30 This phrase first appeared in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972), in which the
Court upheld warrantless inspections of gun stores.
31 See id. (“When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept
a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition
will be subject to effective inspection.”); see also Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313 (“[W]hen an entrepreneur
embarks upon such a business [of gun and liquor sales], he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself
to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.”).
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liquor stores, gun stores, mining operations, and junkyards.32 However, the
Court did not give the government carte blanche in these cases. In Donovan v.
Dewey, for instance, it established that pervasively regulated industries are
still entitled to demand “a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant,”
such as a statute that defines the scope and timing of the inspections and the
precise standards by which the business owner must abide.33
Additionally, the Court has made clear that, despite the ubiquity of
government regulation in virtually every commercial arena, not every
business is pervasively regulated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
While New York v. Burger held that junkyards, which the state of New York
believed were often used to launder stolen automobile parts, fall into that
category,34 the recent decision in City of Los Angeles v. Patel held that hotels,
which the City of Los Angeles was worried might be used to facilitate drug
and sex trafficking, are not pervasively regulated.35 Thus, whereas searches of
junkyard records and lots are permissible in the absence of an ex ante
determination (assuming a sufficiently specific authorizing statute exists),36
under Patel, some type of “precompliance review” is necessary before police
may search registries over the hotel owner’s objection.37
At the same time, the Patel Court had no hesitation in labeling inspections
of hotel registries a “special needs” situation (a label that it also applied,
retroactively, to all of the foregoing cases).38 It concluded that the registry
searches “serve a ‘special need’ other than conducting criminal investigations:
They ensure compliance with the recordkeeping requirement, which in turn
deters criminals from operating on the hotels’ premises.”39 Thus, as in its
other inspection cases, the Court bowed to practicalities by signaling that
police are not required to obtain a warrant to search the registry of a
nonconsenting hotel, but rather can meet Fourth Amendment requirements
if they obtain an “administrative subpoena” from a “neutral decisionmaker”;
32 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (junkyards); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 602 (1981) (mining); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 313 (gun stores); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 392 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (liquor stores).
33 Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603-04; see also Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315 (“In the context of a regulatory
inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality
of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.”).
34 Burger, 482 U.S. at 703-04.
35 See 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015) (“To classify hotels as pervasively regulated would permit
what has always been a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”).
36 Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03.
37 See Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2456 (finding a California ordinance unconstitutional because “it fails
to provide any opportunity for precompliance review before a hotel must give its guest registry to
the police for inspection”).
38 See id. at 2452 (equating special needs searches with administrative searches like those
authorized in Camara).
39 Id.
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further, the latter individual need not be a magistrate but rather can be an
“administrative law judge.”40 While the subpoena can be quashed if the hotel
owner shows the search was for “illicit purposes” or was “used as a pretext to
harass,” presumably that showing can be made only if the officers admit their
illicit purpose or, more likely, the officers failed to follow a neutral inspection
plan in an evenhanded manner.41 Nothing in Patel requires that the
government’s defense of its subpoena be based on explicit proof that the hotel
is harboring criminals. Whether closely regulated or not, and whether their
operation triggers special needs analysis or not, businesses subject to
inspection can count on the protection of an ex ante policy aimed at
minimizing abuses of discretion, but cannot demand a warrant or court order
that requires individualized suspicion.
B. Checkpoints
A separate line of panvasive search and seizure cases involves checkpoints. At
the Supreme Court level, the first such case was United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
which upheld a checkpoint near the border with Mexico that was aimed at
detecting illegal immigrants.42 Citing Camara for the proposition that “the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized]
suspicion,” the Court permitted suspicionless seizures of motorists at the
initial checkpoint because of the minimal intrusion involved and the limits a
checkpoint places on police discretion.43 On the latter point, the Court noted
that the checkpoints were conducted in a “regularized manner” because they
stopped only those cars that passed the checkpoint, thus minimizing “abusive
or harassing stops.”44 Moreover, “[t]he location of a fixed checkpoint is not
chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall
decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources,”
who, the Court assumed, “will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears
arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class.”45
Using similar reasoning, the Court has upheld suspicionless stops on
international waters (for the purpose of checking a boat’s documents),46 at
sobriety checkpoints,47 and, in dictum, at license checkpoints.48 As in
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 2452-53.
Id. at 2452-54.
428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976).
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 559.
Id.
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1983).
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (“This holding does not preclude the State
of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or
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Martinez-Fuerte, these cases sung the praises of the checkpoint’s “regularized”
nature. For instance, in both Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (the
sobriety case) and Delaware v. Prouse (the license case), the Court favorably
distinguished checkpoints from “random stops,” which involve “[the] kind of
standardless and unconstrained discretion [which] is the evil the Court has
discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official
in the field be circumscribed.”49
At the same time, the Court has given short shrift to the argument that
checkpoint procedures do not restrict government power enough. In United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez (the boat case), the Court responded to the
argument that checking documents in port would limit discretion more than
doing so at sea by noting that, given the wide open nature of sea travel and
the fact that ships do not have to dock, such a requirement would make “less
likely” the government’s ability “to accomplish the obviously essential
governmental purposes involved.”50 In Sitz, the Court responded to the
argument that watching for weaving vehicles could be even more effective than
a sobriety checkpoint by stating that “the choice among . . . reasonable
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique
understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a
finite number of police officers.”51 Similarly, in still another roadblock case,
Illinois v. Lidster, the Court sanctioned a roadblock at the scene of a hit-and-run
accident that was designed to identify possible witnesses, implicitly finding
irrelevant the dissent’s observation that a more effective, less intrusive
method of finding witnesses might have been simply to put flyers on the cars
of workers at nearby businesses.52
The Court put its foot down, however, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
involving a checkpoint to detect narcotics using drug-sniffing dogs.53 Here,
for the first time in a checkpoint case, the Court alluded to special needs
analysis. According to the Court, that analysis did not apply because the
“primary purpose” of the roadblock was “to uncover evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing”54—a “general interest in crime control”55—in contrast
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.”).
49 Id. at 661; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454 (reinforcing the Court’s decision in Prouse, but
distinguishing DUI traffic stops because they are not based on decisions by officers in the field).
50 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983).
51 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54.
52 540 U.S. 419, 428-30 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the issue of whether the roadblock was reasonable should be remanded, in part because planting
flyers might have accomplished the State’s goal).
53 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
54 Id. at 41-42.
55 Id. at 40.
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to the roadblocks at issue in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and Prouse’s dictum, which
arose in the special contexts of border security and roadway safety.56 Since
the cars in Edmond were stopped in the absence of individualized suspicion,
the Fourth Amendment was violated.57 However, in a subsequent case, the
Court signaled that if the “primary” purpose of a checkpoint is not ordinary
crime control, the fact that drug-sniffing dogs might be present does not
violate the Constitution so long as the dog sniff does not prolong the
detention.58 Many lower courts have adopted this suggestion as a holding.59
Lower courts have also been willing to slap the special needs moniker on
checkpoints designed to catch terrorists. Most noteworthy is the opinion of
Judge Sotomayor when she was on the Second Circuit, sitting on a case
involving suspicionless searches of cars and people boarding ferries in New
York State.60 Judge Sotomayor found the program to be a special needs
situation because “[p]reventing or deterring large-scale terrorist attacks
present problems that are distinct from standard law enforcement needs and
indeed go well beyond them.”61 She reasoned that, because the Coast Guard
had identified the Lake Champlain ferry as a potential target, and because
the resulting searches of bags and car trunks were announced beforehand,
lasted only a few moments, applied to everyone, and consisted of visual
inspections of vehicles and brief examinations of carry-on baggage aimed at
finding explosives, the Fourth Amendment was not violated.62 Citing the
language from Sitz quoted above, she also dismissed the argument that the
government should have used magnetometers to accomplish its goal in a less
intrusive manner.63
C. Drug Testing
In contrast to inspection and checkpoint cases, special needs analysis has
permeated drug testing cases from the beginning. Both Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Association and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, companion cases upholding suspicionless drug testing programs of
railway workers and customs agents, respectively, began with the proposition
that the primary purpose of the programs was not to obtain evidence for
56
57
58
59

Id. at 42-44 (distinguishing Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and Prouse).
Id. at 47-48.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005).
See Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purposes and Crime
Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 298 (2006) (“[T]he weight of authority so far indicates
that a secondary purpose of crime control will not upset a checkpoint with a lawful primary purpose.”).
60 Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006).
61 Id. at 82.
62 Id. at 79-80, 87.
63 Id. at 80, 85.
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prosecution but rather to promote safety.64 Both cases went on to conclude
that drug testing, while a search, is minimally intrusive, and that the
government’s interest in ensuring its employees are not drug-impaired is
significant, thus making a warrant unnecessary.65 But, echoing the inspection
and checkpoint cases, the majority also emphasized that “in light of the
standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those
charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a
neutral magistrate to evaluate.”66
The Court came to similar conclusions in two cases involving drug
testing in the school setting, the first aimed at student athletes67 and the
second at students involved in any extracurricular activity.68 After
concluding that these cases also came under the special needs rubric,69 the Court
reasoned that a suspicionless testing program is permissible because school
children expect less privacy, the government’s interest in deterring drug use
among such a vulnerable population is compelling, and a suspicion-based
program would be “impracticable.”70 In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (the
student athlete case), the majority also asserted that a suspicion-based program
might harm individual interests more than a group-wide one, given the
likelihood that it would “transform[] the process into a badge of shame,”
increase the potential for discriminatory action by teachers, and divert teachers
from their normal functions.71
The Court struck down two other drug testing programs, however.
Chandler v. Miller confronted a law that required testing of every person
seeking nomination or election to state office in Georgia.72 The Court applied
the special needs label, but, for the first (and only) time in such a case, found
that the government’s interest in the program, which it characterized as
64 See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct
of railroad employees to ensure safety . . . [‘]presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.’”); Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (“It is clear that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program is not designed
to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement . . . [but] to deter drug use among those eligible for
promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to
those positions.”).
65 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-31.
66 Id. at 622.
67 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
68 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
69 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 829-30.
70 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657, 660-64; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 (“[W]e question whether
testing based on individualized suspicion in fact would be less intrusive. Such a regime would place
an additional burden on public school teachers[,] . . . might unfairly target members of unpopular
groups [and because of] fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted searches may chill enforcement
of the program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug use.”).
71 515 U.S. at 663-64.
72 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
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largely symbolic, was outweighed by the individual interests affected.73 It
pointed out that candidates were given thirty-day notice of the testing (thus
making it ineffectual), that their high profile meant that impairment on the
job would be easily discoverable through normal means, and that evidence
that there was any kind of drug problem among candidates was lacking
(unlike in the school testing cases).74 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the
Court refused to find that special needs analysis applied at all because, despite
the city’s protestation that the goal of the program was to seek treatment for
women who used drugs while pregnant and to save their babies, the police
department was heavily involved in implementing the program and positive
test results were sent to the police as a means of cajoling patients into such
treatment.75 While the Court conceded that the ultimate goal of the program
was “benign,” when doctors obtain test results from patients “for the specific
purpose of incriminating those patients,” the Fourth Amendment prohibits a
warrantless procedure unless the patient consents after being informed of
how the results will be used.76
D. DNA Sampling
In Maryland v. King, the Court upheld a state program that permitted
suspicionless DNA testing of every person charged with a crime of violence
or burglary or an attempt to do so.77 Although the Court employed the type
of balancing analysis that had become familiar in its special needs cases, and
although it noted that its result was “in full accord” with that analysis, the
Court explicitly held that King did not involve a special needs situation.78 The
Court explained that the statute did not authorize “programmatic searches of
either the public at large” (as in the inspection, checkpoint, and drug testing
cases) “or a particular class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens”
(as in New Jersey v. T.L.O., involving searches of school children79); rather, it
was aimed at an adult arrested for crime, who “unlike . . . a citizen who has
not been suspected of a wrong, . . . has a reduced expectation of privacy.”80
73
74
75

Id. at 322.
Id. at 319-20.
See 532 U.S. 67, 79-80 (2001) (stating that “the critical difference” between previous drug
testing cases and this one was that “the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its
inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment”).
76 Id. at 85-86 (emphasis omitted).
77 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
78 Id. at 1978.
79 See 469 U.S. 325, 340-43 (1985) (holding that a search of a public school student’s purse did
not require probable cause or a warrant given the diminished privacy expectations of students and
the likelihood the warrant requirement would interfere with “maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools”).
80 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978.
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The fact remains that, in addition to its usefulness in identifying
arrestees,81 DNA is often helpful in convicting a person for the crime of arrest
or in nabbing a perpetrator in the future; for instance, King was arrested for
assault, but his DNA was eventually used to link him to an unrelated rape.82
Some lower courts, recognizing that the search involved in DNA cases is
principally designed for this purpose and thus could be seen as a suspicionless
search for evidence of “ordinary crime,” have felt the need to justify DNA
sampling on special needs grounds.83 They easily do so, reasoning that, at the
time of the search, the government “is not trying to ‘determine that a
particular individual has engaged in some specific wrongdoing.’”84
Under either approach, balancing analysis applies and, for the Court in
King, it was straightforward. The Court found that the buccal swab necessary
to get a DNA sample is minimally intrusive, at least if, as required by
Maryland law, all of those arrested for serious offenses are subject to it; that
regime avoids judgment calls by officers whose perspective might otherwise
be “colored by their primary involvement in ‘the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.’”85 The value of the DNA to the government, in
contrast, can be significant, as the King case itself showed.
E. Surveillance Programs
Many surveillance programs operate by collecting information or
observations about a large number of predominately law-abiding individuals
in the hope that patterns of criminal activity can be discovered or that the
data will subsequently help convict someone. Camera systems record activity
in large sectors of urban areas twenty-four hours a day.86 Tracking systems
can monitor every car traveling through areas under surveillance in real time
81 The majority noted, inter alia, that DNA is more accurate than fingerprinting at identifying
people, and thus better able to ensure that government officials obtain accurate information about
an arrestee’s criminal history and dangerousness that can help in pretrial release and jail security
decisions. Id. at 1971-75.
82 Id. at 1966. The dissent argued that crime detection was the primary reason for the Maryland
statute. See id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is obvious that no . . . noninvestigative motive
exists in this case. The Court’s assertion that DNA is being taken, not to solve crimes, but to identify
those in the State’s custody, taxes the credulity of the credulous.”).
83 See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 667 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Mitchell,
652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting special needs analysis, but applying balancing analysis to permit
collection of DNA not only for identification purposes but for the purpose of solving other cases).
84 Goord, 430 F.3d at 668 (quoting Report and Recommendation, Nicholas v. Goord, No. 017891, 2003 WL 256774, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003)).
85 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
12 (1968)).
86 See generally THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING COMMUNITIES AND PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES
(2007) (describing video surveillance systems).
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and retrospectively.87 And, as Edward Snowden told the world, the federal
government at one time routinely swept up virtually everyone’s “metadata”—the
identifying information about our communications—and may well have collected
(and continue to collect) much more than that.88
At the initial collection stage, all of these surveillance techniques are
suspicionless; their whole point is to obtain and store information about a large
population, presumably mostly innocent, for later analysis.89 The analysis stage,
in contrast, is suspicion-based, whether it seeks patterns or is going after a
particular individual.90 While the attempt to discern patterns—for instance,
which cars visit a crime-ridden area, or which phones are used to contact
someone in ISIS-held territory—can proceed anonymously via computer until
the government observes the pattern of interest,91 the government can also
easily “de-identify” most of the information it collects, at which point the
suspicion model kicks in.92 A traditional suspicion-based search also takes place
if the government already has a suspect or knows about a crime and uses the
data to find out where the suspect is or who committed the crime.93
87 See Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the Post–United States v. Jones
Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 553, 565-66 (2015) (noting that
tracking systems allow common carriers, and therefore the government, to collect information from
phones and cars about everyone’s travel over time).
88 See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the
Internet,’ GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsatop-secret-program-online-data [https://perma.cc/K3VQ-HWBX] (describing a file provided by
Snowden that purportedly discusses an NSA program called XKeyscore, which “allows analysts to
search with no prior authorization through vast databases containing emails, online chats and the
browsing histories of millions of individuals,” encompassing “nearly everything a typical user does
on the internet”).
89 Although Congress recently ended the NSA’s ability to engage in bulk collection of domestic
metadata, which now must be stored with the common carrier, the NSA still collects metadata of calls made
by or to an individual in the United States to or from someone overseas. Faiza Patel, Bulk Collection Under
Section 215 Has Ended . . . What’s Next?, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 30, 2015, 2:25 PM), https://
www.justsecurity.org/27996/bulk-collection-ended-whats-next [https://perma.cc/9NXD-TUUG].
90 For instance, according to the NSA, the surveillance starts with a “seed identifier” such as a
phone number or email address that the agency has “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to believe is
associated with a terrorist organization. The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities, Oversight
and Partnerships, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.nsa.gov/newsfeatures/press-room/statements/2013-08-09-the-nsa-story.shtml [https://perma.cc/72MK-5X2K].
91 See id. (“Technical controls preclude NSA analysts from seeing any metadata unless it is the
result of a query using an approved identifier.”); see also Shaun B. Spencer, When Targeting Becomes
Secondary: A Framework for Regulating Predictive Surveillance in Antiterrorism Investigations, 92 DENV.
U. L. REV. 493, 496 (2015) (noting that current law fails to grapple with the collection and
anonymous-analysis phase of terrorism investigations).
92 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1706 (2010) (asserting that “advances in reidentification thwart the aims of
nearly every privacy law and regulation”).
93 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 191-96 (2007) (describing “event-driven” surveillance).
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The focus of this discussion of panvasive surveillance, then, is the
collection stage. While the Supreme Court has yet to deal with this precise
issue, some lower courts, relying on Supreme Court precedent, have held that
data compilation does not even trigger the Fourth Amendment, at least if the
information compiled concerns activity in public or data surrendered to a
third party such as an internet service provider or a phone company (as is the
case with the metadata program).94 At least one court has bucked this trend,
holding that the NSA’s metadata collection program is a Fourth Amendment
“search,” and strongly suggesting that, even under special needs reasoning,
the program is unconstitutional given the government’s failure to provide
evidence that the program has detected any terrorists.95 Even if this view
prevails in the metadata context, however, it may not transfer to the type of
information collected via cameras and tracking devices, where courts have
been reluctant to find that the Fourth Amendment applies.96
F. Summary
Surveying the courts’—and, in particular, the Supreme Court’s—decisions
in panvasive search and seizure cases as a whole, four themes stand out. First,
the courts are concerned with whether the program is in aid of “ordinary crime
control” or aimed at something else. Second, if the primary goal of the
program is something other than crime control, the courts do not require
individualized suspicion but rather engage in balancing the government’s
interest against the privacy and autonomy interests of those affected in
figuring out the degree of protection warranted. Third, the panvasive nature
of the search and seizure tends to enhance the government’s position because,
in the courts’ eyes, its regularized nature diminishes the impact on privacy at
the same time as it limits official discretion. Finally, while the Supreme Court
94 See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the “collection
of breathtaking amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform
that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search,” and, relying on Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979), holding the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program to be constitutional), vacated
in part, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. 13-109, slip op. at 9 (FISA Ct.
Aug. 29, 2013) (relying on Smith to conclude that, because the Application concerned only call detail
records or telephony metadata, there was no Fourth Amendment impediment to the collection).
95 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding the metadata
program unconstitutional but staying the decision pending review by the appellate courts).
96 See State v. Augafa, 992 P.2d 723, 725 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that “open and visible
video camera surveillance of the public sidewalk area on which Defendant was situated was not
violative of Defendant’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches”); see also United States v.
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a court order mandating the production of cell
phone records did not violate the Fourth Amendment). But see United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332,
344-45 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We hold that the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment
when it obtains and inspects a cell phone user’s historical CSLI for an extended period of time.”).
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is influenced by evidence that a suspicion-based approach would render the
government’s goal very difficult to achieve, it is usually unmoved by evidence
that such an approach could provide an effective alternative.
One other aspect of these cases bears emphasis. Despite the fact that all
of them involve panvasive actions pursuant to policies promulgated and
implemented by law enforcement agencies, the Supreme Court has never
explicitly turned to administrative law for help in its analysis. Outside of
allusions to that course of action in its inspection cases (discussed in Part III),
the Court is content with an ad hoc approach that adopts no particular
regulatory structure. Partly as a result, its jurisprudence in this area is a mass
of contradictions, as the next Part makes clear.
II. THE COURT AND ITS CRITICS
A comparison of the decisions that approve panvasive searches and
seizures to those that do not reveals an embarrassingly incoherent
jurisprudence. Other commentators have criticized these cases, but not in the
comparative way undertaken here. Nor have commentators been particularly
successful at improving the analysis of panvasive searches and seizures. After
critiquing the Court’s cases, this Part analyzes the primary competitor to the
Court’s approach, which I call the strict scrutiny model because it tracks that
type of Fourteenth Amendment analysis. This Part also examines the work of
commentators who have proposed a third alternative—legislative and
administrative regulation that is encouraged through judicial means—and
begins to distinguish that approach from the more straightforward
administrative law tack proposed in this Article.
A. The Supreme Court’s Free-For-All
The Supreme Court’s cases dealing with panvasive searches and seizures
are difficult to figure out. With respect to each of the four themes identified
above—the ordinary crime threshold, balancing analysis, regularization, and
the availability of alternatives—the Court has sent conflicting signals.
Explicitly since the creation of the special needs rubric and implicitly
before then, the Court has permitted panvasive searches and seizures only
when special circumstances beyond “ordinary crime control” are involved.97
But virtually all panvasive searches and seizures—most obviously DNA
sampling and surveillance,98 but also those that involve inspections,
checkpoints, or drug testing—are aimed at crime control. Most regulatory

97
98

See supra Part I.
See supra text accompanying notes 81–88.
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inspections are backed up by criminal sanctions.99 Criminal charges not only
arise out of stops at narcotics checkpoints, which the Court has declared are
not a special needs situation, but also routinely follow Court-approved stops
at sobriety checkpoints, checkpoints for illegal immigrants, and checkpoints
in international waters (and, indeed, the litigants in all of the relevant Court
cases were subject to criminal charges).100 And while it is true that the threat
of criminal prosecution was particularly explicit in the drug testing program
struck down in Ferguson,101 the possibility of criminal charges hovers in the
background any time someone tests positive for an illegal substance. Further,
serious quasi-criminal consequences (suspension from employment or school
activities, for instance) are virtually inevitable.102
The difficulties that the Court’s case law have created are evident in Patel,
the Court’s most recent foray into this area. There, the Court “assumed” that
the searches authorized by the city’s hotel registry inspection ordinance
“serve[d] a ‘special need’ other than conducting criminal investigations,” to wit
“deter[ring] criminals from operating on the hotels’ premises.”103 Not explained
was why deterrence of crime is not considered an aspect of “ordinary” police
work, but investigation of crime is. In any event, surely the Los Angeles city
council that enacted the ordinance was just as interested in detecting criminals
who were on hotel premises as it was in deterring them from frequenting such
places. There can be no deterrence without the possibility of detection; every
panvasive search and seizure program tries to accomplish both goals.
More fundamentally, the Court has never made clear why the distinction
between crime control and its opposite (perhaps regulatory control?) matters.
Apparently, the idea is that those suspected of “ordinary crime” are entitled
99 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (junkyard owner arrested for five counts
of possessing stolen property found during inspection); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(pawn shop operator convicted of dealing in firearms without having paid occupational tax, as the
result of an inspection); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (store owner
suspected of refilling liquor bottles, which under 26 U.S.C. § 5301(e) can bring a criminal penalty
of up to one year).
100 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (suit seeking to enjoin sobriety
checkpoint, making clear that those found drunk would be arrested); United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (boarding of boat based on 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which sets out penalties
for faulty documents); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (driver stopped at
checkpoint near border charged with two counts of illegally transporting aliens); see also supra notes
58–59 and accompanying text (describing license checkpoints accompanied by drug-sniffing dogs).
101 See supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
102 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 683 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he substantial consequences that can flow from a positive test, such as suspension from sports, are
invariably—and quite reasonably—understood as punishment.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 650 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he agency’s regulations . . . appear to invite
criminal prosecutors to obtain the blood and urine samples drawn by [railway authorities] and use them
as the basis of criminal investigations and trials.”).
103 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015).
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to greater constitutional recognition because of the greater deprivation of
liberty associated with arrest and conviction for a crime. But as Justice White
pointed out in Camara, the first panvasive search and seizure case, “It is surely
anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected
of criminal behavior.”104
Once denominated a special needs situation, a panvasive search or seizure
is subjected to balancing analysis under the reasonableness clause.105 Here,
too, the Court has sent mixed messages, in part because of its confusing stance
on the crime control distinction. One way of demonstrating the confusion is
by considering the Court’s cases by category (e.g., inspections, checkpoints,
and drug testing). That method of analysis allows both the level of intrusion
and the degree of regularization—important to the second and third themes
identified above—to be held constant, and exposes the Court’s inconsistency.
Thus, for instance, while the Court considered detection of stolen car parts
in New York sufficiently important to allow suspicionless inspection of
junkyard records,106 it was apparently not as concerned about detecting the
drug, sex, and human trafficking allegedly transpiring in a large number of
Los Angeles hotels.107 Likewise, interdiction of narcotics transportation was
not considered an important enough goal to justify the checkpoint in
Edmond,108 while detecting illegal immigration, drunk driving, and suspended
licenses were adequate grounds for permitting the checkpoints discussed in
Martinez-Fuerte,109 Sitz,110 and Prouse.111 While the Court might well be right
that the government’s interest in stopping drug use by political candidates is
less substantial than its interest in detecting drug use among railway workers,
104
105

Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 522, 530 (1967).
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (“When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated
to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and
probable-cause requirements in the particular context.”).
106 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703, 709 (1987) (noting that “regulation of the
vehicle-dismantling industry reasonably serves the State’s substantial interest in eradicating
automobile theft”).
107 See Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2457 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “the parties do not dispute”
that motels “are a particularly attractive site for criminal activity ranging from drug dealing and
prostitution to human trafficking”).
108 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (stating that “the gravity of the
threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose”).
109 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“[M]aintenance of a
traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be
controlled effectively at the border.”).
110 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“No one can seriously
dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.”).
111 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979) (recognizing states’ “vital interest in
ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles”).
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customs agents, and school children,112 the protection of unborn babies from
their mothers’ substance abuse would seem to trump most or all of these other
goals; yet, the Court’s decision in Ferguson stands for the contrary proposition.113
Of course, a balancing analysis can consider a host of other factors, the most
important of which raises the fourth theme found in the Court’s cases: the
efficacy of a panvasive search or seizure compared to its feasible alternatives.
As with the other factors, however, the Court’s reliance on this factor is erratic.
Consider again the Court’s cases by category, in reverse order this time. In the
drug testing cases, the relative efficacy factor points in precisely the opposite
direction of the Court’s conclusions: suspicion of drug use by school children
and employees is much easier to develop than suspicion of drug use by
pregnant mothers, who are not subject to the constant monitoring that the
first two groups are.114 The same assertion can be made about the Court’s
checkpoint decisions. Developing a good hunch in a case like Edmond (where
the working assumption of the police was that drug traffickers were hiding
drugs in their cars115) is significantly more difficult than in cases like Sitz
(involving drunk driving, which is often observable) or Martinez-Fuerte
(involving illegal immigration, also usually observable), 116 yet the Court gave
the government a break only in the latter settings. And if, as the Court has
indicated in its Patel decision, the government’s concern about precompliance
review (which might tip off miscreant hotel owners) can be alleviated by seizing
the hotel’s records pending a subpoena,117 why isn’t the same procedure required
in the junkyard, gun shop, and liquor store settings?118
112 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (contrasting Georgia’s concerns about drug
use by political candidates with “the evidence of drug and alcohol use by railway employees engaged
in safety-sensitive tasks in Skinner, and the immediate crisis prompted by a sharp rise in students’
use of unlawful drugs in Vernonia” (citations omitted)).
113 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71 (2001) (holding that nonconsensual,
suspicionless drug testing of pregnant women violated the Fourth Amendment, despite “an apparent
increase in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal treatment”).
114 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“In most schools, the entire pool of potential search targets—students—is under constant supervision
by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker rooms.”).
115 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000) (characterizing the highway
checkpoint program as one “to interdict unlawful drugs”).
116 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 461-62 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting a study showing that Michigan police, using normal investigative techniques, made 71,000
such arrests in one year); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 575 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court had held that stops based on reasonable suspicion could be based
on factors such as the type of car, its apparent load, and whether it contains an extraordinary number
of people or people trying to hide (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975))).
117 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015) (“In most contexts, business
owners can be afforded at least an opportunity to contest an administrative search’s propriety
without unduly compromising the government’s ability to achieve its regulatory aims.”).
118 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 710 (1987) (upholding a statute that permitted
warrantless entry into a junkyard, stating that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at
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The Supreme Court purports to have developed coherent rationales in its
panvasive search and seizure decisions. That is far from the case. While Part
IV of this Article agrees with the Court that regularization is a crucial
requirement in panvasive cases, and also contends that efficacy considerations
should be pertinent, these factors, as applied by the Court, are singularly poor
at explaining the results the Court has reached.
B. The Strict Scrutiny Alternative
Many commentators have lambasted the Court’s decisions on panvasive
searches and seizures, usually on the ground that they take insufficient
account of the privacy intrusion involved and the possible alternatives to
suspicionless action. Most of these commentators have proposed instead
some version of what could be called a strict scrutiny model of analysis.119
Under this model, courts would determine (1) whether the government
objective is “compelling” and (2) whether the investigative technique chosen
by the government is the least restrictive way of achieving it.
An initial concern with the strict scrutiny model is that, in other
constitutional contexts, this type of analysis has always been reserved for
governmental actions that affect “fundamental” rights or engage in suspect
classifications.120 While the Fourth Amendment’s right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures is, as a general matter, fundamental, the
Court’s cases reasonably recognize that not all searches and seizures are equally
intrusive or equally deserving of similar protection.121 It is surely a stretch to

remedying this major social problem is to function at all”); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972) (upholding warrantless entry of a gun store for inspection purposes on the ground that
“if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent,
inspections are essential”); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970)
(upholding criminal conviction for refusal to permit an inspector’s entry into a liquor storeroom).
119 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 21, at 261-62 (arguing that dragnets should not be permitted if
individualized suspicion can accomplish the government’s objective); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The
Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L.
REV. 483, 487 (1995) (arguing that suspicionless searches and seizures should be “aberrational” and
founded on “a strong showing of governmental necessity”); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment
in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1173, 1176-77 (1988) (arguing for least drastic means analysis); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to
Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 446 (1988)
(arguing for a compelling state interest or least intrusive means test that “unambiguously reorients
fourth amendment analysis toward protection of the individual’s privacy interest”).
120 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (“[A] government practice or statute which restricts
‘fundamental rights’ . . . is to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers
a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”).
121 This is a principle with which I agree, albeit with significant caveats about how the Court
applies it. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 93, at 21-47 (defending a Fourth Amendment justification
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say that a search of an impersonal business property or a fifteen-second seizure
at a roadblock implicates the same “fundamental right” as a search of a bedroom
or an arrest.122 At the least, scrutiny of lesser types of searches and seizures
might call for modulation of both the word “compelling” in the first stage of
the analysis and the phrase “least restrictive” in the second.
More important as a practical matter, while the two queries generated by
strict scrutiny analysis are routinely raised and answered in other contexts,
they are close to imponderable in the criminal justice setting. That is because,
in structure, the strict scrutiny model is no different than the Court’s special
needs approach. Indeed, precisely because the model requires stronger proof
than the Court has demanded concerning both the importance of the
government’s interest and the difficulty of achieving it through other means,
it is even more likely to raise the conundra the Court’s analysis does.
Begin with the first, “compelling interest,” prong of strict scrutiny
analysis. Even with the thumb on the scale implied by the word “compelling,”
the inquiry into the strength of the government’s objectives sends judges into
a morass. Courts are understandably loathe to say that the state does not have
a strong interest in stifling illegal immigration, drunk driving, and safety code
violations, much less terrorism. Nor is gauging the government’s interest at
less abstract levels any easier. Consider the following statistics from the
checkpoint cases: 0.12% of those stopped at the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte
were illegal immigrants,123 1.6% of those stopped at the checkpoint in Sitz
were drunk,124 and (very perturbingly) almost 9% of those stopped at the
checkpoint in Edmond had narcotics or other illegal items in their cars.125
Initially, the government’s interest seems stronger in the latter case (where
the government lost) than in the other two (where it won). At the same time,
the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte handled a much greater traffic flow (which
might have lowered the hit rate) and was more permanent (and thus perhaps
a better deterrent) than the checkpoints in the other two cases.126 These
considerations about the size of the hit rates in these cases and what they
scheme based on proportionality reasoning, but requiring suspicion in many cases where the Court
requires none).
122 See id. at 112, 184 (providing data showing that the “intrusion” associated with different
investigative techniques varies significantly); see also MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION
MATTERS 152-53 (2010) (“How can we deal with deep and persisting disagreement about what our
fundamental rights are? By coming to grips with the fact that these disagreements are reasonable,
no different in principle from our disagreements about how to finance a national health care policy
or about the proper tax rate for capital gains.”).
123 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
124 Id.
125 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).
126 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (explaining the rationale for
situating checkpoints along important highways).
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mean pose, at the least, a major challenge in deciding whether they
demonstrate a significant problem.
Since the government’s interest can almost always be made to look
compelling,127 advocates of the strict scrutiny alternative will usually have to
fall back on the second prong of the scrutiny analysis, involving assessments of
whether suspicion-based searches and seizures or some other “less restrictive”
alternative can achieve the government’s goal. This prong presents even more
of a quandary, however, because it requires evaluation of variables that courts
are ill-equipped to assess, specifically the impact of a given panvasive program
compared to its suspicion-based alternative. That is probably why, as indicated
earlier, the Supreme Court has completely shied away from the subject.
Consider the following questions about the potential alternatives to the
panvasive actions involved in the cases discussed in Part I:
• First, there are questions about the efficacy of suspicion-based
alternatives: For instance, are suspicion-based car stops more effective
than checkpoints at detecting and inhibiting illegal immigrants,
drunk drivers, and drivers transporting narcotics, or are widely
publicized checkpoints likely to have a greater deterrent effect?128
Will drug testing that can only take place if some type of impairment
is perceived be as protective of students in schools and passengers on
railway trains as the drug testing programs aimed at those groups in
Vernonia and Skinner?129 Is the low hit rate of the NSA’s metadata
program130 a sign of failure, or is it evidence that the program is a
127 This is so even in cases where the government loses or has little data. See, e.g., Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001) (noting that the Charleston hospital staff had noticed an
increase in cocaine use among women seeking prenatal care); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 324
(1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing, despite the absence of evidence indicating a significant
drug abuse problem among political candidates, that “surely the State need not wait for a drug
addict, or one inclined to use drugs illegally, to run for or actually become Governor before it installs
a prophylactic mechanism”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989)
(concluding that, even though there was no evidence of a serious drug abuse problem among customs
agents, “the Government has demonstrated that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders
and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to
positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry
a firearm”).
128 Compare supra text accompanying note 51, with U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS:
SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN LITERATURE 14 (1992), http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/25000/25800/25836/
DOT-HS-807-862.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ77-N28Q] (finding that prior studies support the
hypothesis that sobriety checkpoints can deter impaired driving).
129 Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 680 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I
recognize that a suspicion-based scheme, even where reasonably effective in controlling in-school
drug use, may not be as effective as a mass, suspicionless testing regime.”).
130 Compare Yochai Benkler, Fact: The NSA Gets Negligible Intel from Americans’ Metadata. So
End Collection, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/oct/08/nsa-bulk-metadata-surveillance-intelligence [https://perma.cc/SF75-7DU9] (arguing
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significant deterrent, and should it matter that prohibiting collection
and retention of metadata will gravely hinder the government’s ability
to investigate the communication history of an individual it
subsequently suspects of terrorism?131
Second, there are questions about the efficacy of alternatives to panvasive
actions that are not suspicion-based. For instance, are the Lidster dissent’s
flyers or the magnetometer rejected by Judge Sotomayor in Cassidy (the
ferry case) as likely to achieve the government’s goal as the method
chosen by the government? Should the Court in Ferguson have considered
the likelihood that its ruling would replace a program that gave pregnant
cocaine users a second and third chance with a rule that imposes a “more
rigorous system?”132 If, as is likely, DNA testing of arrestees is more
effective at clearing unsolved crime than suspicion-based testing, why
isn’t DNA testing of the entire population permissible for the same
reason?133 Alternatively, if DNA testing of arrestees is held to be
impermissible, is DNA testing of convicted felons impermissible as well,
or is it permissible on the ground that it will generate a higher percentage
of clearances?
Finally, there are comparative questions about the intrusiveness of these
various alternatives to panvasive actions. Are panvasive actions affecting
large groups of people more inimical to government legitimacy or, as
suggested by the majority in Vernonia,134 are suspicion-based actions
that end up erroneously, and perhaps discriminatorily, singling out
individuals more likely to antagonize the populace and occasion a
greater overall sense of intrusiveness?135

that the marginal evidence of the effectiveness of the NSA’s metadata collection program calls for
the discontinuance of the program), with ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(recounting three terrorist plots allegedly foiled through metadata analysis), vacated in part, 785 F.3d
787 (2d Cir. 2015).
131 See Rahul Srinivas, Edward Snowden’s Revelations Have ‘Clearly Helped the ISIS’, Claims Former
NSA Official, INQUISITR (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1454270/edward-snowden-helpedisis [https://perma.cc/96U5-7CB9] (discussing a former NSA official’s comments regarding the
negative impact that Edward Snowden’s revelations had on the government’s counterterrorism effort).
132 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 90 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (after
noting that doctors could, for legitimate medical reasons, test pregnant women for cocaine, and that
prosecutors could “adopt legitimate procedures” to obtain this information, stating that “[o]ne of
the ironies of the case, then, may be that the program now under review, which gives the cocaine
user a second and third chance, might be replaced by some more rigorous system”).
133 See generally Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection of DNA, 48 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 261 (2015) (arguing that such a system is constitutionally permissible).
134 See supra text accompanying note 71.
135 See Tom R. Tyler et al., The Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of
Proactive Police Contact, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 603 (2015) (“Our argument is that it is
not contact with the police per se that is problematic. . . . Rather it is contact that communicates
suspicion and mistrust that undermines the relationship between the public and the police.”).
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These types of questions do not begin to exhaust the list of issues that
strict scrutiny analysis needs to address in these cases. There may be answers
to them, but the answers will not be easy. Arguably, these empirical quagmires
are better left to legislatures and the executive branch.136 That, at least, is the
assumption that informs the work of those commentators who have argued
that the political process may be a better mechanism for regulating many
types of police work.
C. The New Administrativists
Andrew Crespo recently coined the term “new adminstrativist” to
describe a resurgent trend in criminal justice scholarship that suggests that
legislatures and administrative agencies are often better situated than courts
to identify and constrain abuses of state power in the criminal justice system,
and thus protect core constitutional rights and liberties.137 On this view, the
capacity of the political branches to address issues in a comprehensive and
data-driven fashion, rather than through the case-by-case and relatively
intuition-laden manner usually prevalent in the courts, makes them better at
evaluating the systemic effects of criminal procedure rules; this structural
approach may, in turn, result in superior protection of constitutional rights as
a pragmatic matter.138 The argument is also made, particularly by those who
are concerned about the advent of surveillance technologies, that legislatures
and the executive branch can be more responsive to rapidly changing
investigative techniques, and also devise more creative means of regulating
136 The literature on interbranch competencies is vast and will not be regurgitated here. See
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (4th ed. 2007). For my own take on the issue,
see Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1733-45 (2014), which provides arguments based on political process
theory as to why legislative approaches should normally be preferred in devising panvasive policies.
137 See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2059 (2016) (describing “contemporary scholars” who advocate a
“pivot toward agency-centric regulation of law enforcement authority . . . leveraging valuable
insights from administrative law in the hopes of righting [the] criminal justice system”).
138 Id. at 2051-54; see also Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 515, 603 (2000) (arguing, in the criminal justice context, for “a relaxed administrative-type
rulemaking process . . . that draws upon but is not constrained by [the APA or state equivalents]”);
John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 213 (2015)
(“[I]n some areas of criminal procedure regularly litigated in criminal cases, second-order regulation
should benefit defendants overall, while freeing political policy makers to choose the most cost-effective
constitutional safeguards that will get the job done.”); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as
Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1045, 1111 (2016) (noting that administrative
agencies can be “more systematic and data-driven” than courts and thus can be more “holistic” in
their approach to regulating law enforcement).
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them, than courts that must both wait for a case and controversy and resolve it
based on hidebound precedent that offers only a few options.139 Further, Barry
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have forcefully contended that political
institutions should be brought into the picture to ensure that police are
accountable for their actions through the democratic process, a move which
they believe might be preferable to a regulatory regime based on exclusion or
damages in individual cases.140 In short, the new administrativists posit that
administrative law can help fill in the gaps left by constitutional jurisprudence.
I place myself in the new administrativist category. In other work, I have
argued that administrative law principles can help ensure that police practices
are authorized, rationalized, and transparent, even if the Fourth Amendment
has little or nothing to say about them.141 But neither my previous work nor that
of the other new administrativists sufficiently addresses three crucial issues.
First, and probably most importantly, little is said about how legislatures
and agencies are to be motivated to produce constitutionally sufficient
regulatory regimes.142 The usual suggestion is to use the Fourth Amendment
as leverage. On this view, courts should announce that, unless legislatures and
agencies specifically authorize the police conduct, it should be declared
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.143 Outside of a few isolated
139 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (“I contend that the legislative branch rather
than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology is changing.”);
Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 925 (2004) (“The case for
court review of reasonable procedures [rather than substantive review] is significantly stronger if
limited to the context of emerging technologies.”).
140 See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1875 (2015) (“[J]udicial review is not, and could not possibly be, a substitute for democratic
accountability. Yet, democratic review is what is necessary to strike the policy balance that rests at
the bottom of policing decisions.”).
141 Slobogin, supra note 136, at 1758-75.
142 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 138, at 256-57 (suggesting the Court will voluntarily resort
to a second-order regime once it realizes its epistemic and political advantages); Renan, supra note
138, at 1108 (recognizing that “[c]ourts have been reluctant to evaluate programmatic efficacy under
the Fourth Amendment,” but offering no mechanism for overcoming that reluctance). The one
exception is found in Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140. These authors argue that “courts
ought to defer to police decisions about enforcement methods only to the extent that those decisions
represent considered, fact-based judgments formulated with democratic input,” and propose five
ways in which courts can encourage such judgments. Id. at 1892-1903. But all of their prescriptions
require courts to act in ways that, in recent years at least, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to
pursue; at bottom, these authors, too, do not provide a coercive mechanism for implementing
administrative principles, which they suggest are insufficient in any event. Cf. id. at 1883 (“The risk
of arbitrariness in this context is far too great to give policing agencies the same discretion to forego
rulemaking that the APA gives to traditional administrative agencies.”).
143 See, e.g., id. at 1898 (“Courts can refuse deference when there is a constitutional doubt, but
by the same token they can accord deference if policing is governed by rules that are the product of
sound democratic processes.”); Swire, supra note 139, at 925 (adapting Anthony Amsterdam’s
formulation that defines reasonableness primarily in terms of whether a search or seizure “is
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contexts, however, the Supreme Court has demonstrated no inclination to
pursue this route, and on the few occasions when it has held that legislative
or executive policies can fulfill the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement (discussed in Part III), it has indicated that virtually any policy
will do.144 Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment is useless as leverage, even
in this weak sense, in situations that do not infringe reasonable expectations
of privacy; unfortunately, those situations include police use of many of the
surveillance and datamining techniques that the new administrativists would
like to see regulated.145
Second, assuming we get the political branches to act, the new
administrativists are unduly sanguine about the ability of legislatures and
their delegatees to avoid catering to law enforcement interests. Admittedly,
there are examples of legislation providing the same or even greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment requires.146 But as Part I demonstrated, numerous
other domains have been left alone or regulated only minimally by the other
two branches. Presumably, this void is due at least in part to collective action
problems; law enforcement entities are better organized and their needs more
salient to legislatures than are the needs of the groups that are most directly
affected by the police.147 Claims that police will impose limits on themselves

conducted pursuant to and in conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and
regulations” (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 416 (1974))); Peter P. Swire & Erin E. Murphy, How to Address Standardless Discretion
After Jones 2 (Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies at the Ohio State Univ. Mortiz Coll.
of Law, Working Paper No. 177, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2122941 [https://perma.cc/4KUYFX2F] (arguing that if no legislation or executive branch policies exist, the intrusion should be declared
unreasonable, but that if such policies do exist, “the court would assess their constitutionality,” a review
that “although meaningful, would be deferential and structural in nature”).
144 See infra text accompanying notes 192–95 (describing the Court’s inspection cases); see also
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (holding that, while an inventory of items in a car is only valid
if conducted pursuant to a policy, “policies of opening all containers or of opening no containers are
unquestionably permissible [as are policies that] allow the opening of closed containers whose
contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers’ exteriors”).
145 See supra note 8.
146 The best example is the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (2012), which allows a warrant for interception of oral and wire communications to be issued
only if “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” and only if the warrant directs that the
interception “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception,” two requirements that go beyond standard Fourth Amendment
rules. Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44, 55, 59 (1967) (invalidating a New York statute
permitting eavesdropping in part because it authorized officers to seize any and all conversations
based on a reasonable ground to believe that evidence of a crime may be obtained).
147 Probably the best known account of this problem is found in Donald A. Dripps, Criminal
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About
the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079-81 (1993), which asserts that legislatures
have done little by way of limiting the discretion of police because “an overwhelming preponderance
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once they are made to understand the full impact of their power,148 or that
the rules that come from self-regulation will result in more overall protection
because they will be better obeyed than stricter Fourth Amendment standards
imposed by distant and unempathetic courts,149 ring hollow in light of the
multifaceted pressure to fight crime the police face on a daily basis.150
Third, even assuming a less one-sided rulemaking environment, the new
administrativists tend to be vague about the way administrative principles
will ensure robust limitations on law enforcement. Reference is made to
notice-and-comment procedures and similar administrative law standbys, but
detail as to how they would work in the law enforcement context is usually
lacking.151 More thought needs to go into formulating both the necessary
process and the substance of policing as administration.
The burden of Part III is to address these issues. It first explains why law
enforcement must abide by administrative principles, at least where panvasive
actions are involved. It then explains how those principles can reduce public
choice pressures and ensure that police discretion is limited.
III. WHY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPLIES TO PANVASIVE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Administrative agencies exist in large part because legislatures (and
courts) do not have the expertise or resources to deal with the complex
regulatory issues that arise in a modern state.152 For most agencies, that
of political incentives favor unrestricted enforcement of the criminal law, even if this means abusive
police methods.”
148 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 95
(1969) (“[E]ven the police themselves need to be educated in the realities of what they are doing;
many of them would refuse to participate if they were more sharply aware of the realities.”).
149 See Rappaport, supra note 138, at 255 (“We should not regret the loss of paper-tiger rights
if they are replaced with rules that, because better obeyed, will actually improve net social realities.”).
150 See Albert T. Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6
AM. J. CRIM. L. 25, 28-33 (1978) (describing training, peer, organizational, prosecutorial, and
political pressures on the police that contribute to a “crime control bias” on the part of the police).
151 Renan is probably the most specific, but she suggests that, to ensure administrative
principles apply to surveillance agencies, current law would have to be interpreted in an innovative
fashion. Renan, supra note 138, at 1082-85; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1877
(calling for “clearer legislative authorization on the front end, rules adopted by police departments
themselves through a transparent process that allows for public participation, or some other method
of obtaining community input into policing policy”); Swire & Murphy, supra note 143, at 3
(proposing, in toto, that courts look at the extent to which the statute minimizes government
intrusions and includes “mechanisms of transparency and accountability”).
152 See Patricia M. Wald, The “New Administrative Law”—with the Same Old Judges in It?, 1991
DUKE L.J. 647, 658-59 (“[A]sking judges to familiarize themselves enough with the policies and
operations of the dozens of agencies that appear in hundreds of cases a year, and whose functions
vary from labor to shipping to nuclear energy to gas regulation, so that we can participate as equals
in their good governance, is asking a great deal.”); Peter Marra, Comment, Have Administrative
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expertise is exercised within the substantive and procedural constraints of the
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its state and local
equivalents.153 While the Constitution supplies the legal backdrop,
administrative law is the primary means of regulating most agencies.154
The analogy to police departments is straightforward. Police and other
law enforcement agencies possess expertise about the various ways the
criminal law and associated regulatory statutes can be enforced that
legislatures (and courts) usually do not have. Police agencies are much better
positioned to make decisions about resource allocation and the relative
efficacy of enforcement methods than are other institutions.155 The assertion
made here is that, as in other administrative contexts, exercise of that
expertise should be mediated through administrative law.
If administrative law were the template governing panvasive searches and
seizures, the relevant inquiries would not be about whether the primary
purpose of a program is crime control or whether that purpose is compelling,
nor would they center on the program’s efficacy compared to a suspicion-based
regime. Rather, as is the case with the programs of other agencies, the focus
would be on whether the police department has followed a rational procedure
that produced a rational policy consistent with legislative directives and on
whether the policy is implemented in an evenhanded manner.156 While this
regulatory regime is fairly deferential to police-initiated programs, it would
impose more structured constraints on them than current Supreme Court law
does. In fact, an administrative law regime of the type described below would
not countenance the outcomes in many of the cases in which the Court has
approved panvasive searches and seizures, or at least would place a heavier
burden on the government in order to prevail.

Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 777 (1996) (describing why, in
light of legislative inefficiencies, “the need for administrative agencies is arguably irrefutable”).
153 The federal APA is found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 501–59 (2012). As indicated earlier, most states
have their own administrative procedure acts, which are largely modeled on the federal one. See
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 300 (1986)
(“Because most current state APAs are based in whole or in part on the 1946 and the 1961 model
[state administrative procedure] acts, and those model acts incorporate many general concepts
embedded in the federal act, the federal APA appears to have had a significant impact on the
development of state administrative procedure law.”). While local governments, which are
responsible for most police agencies, are typically exempt from state APAs, they are not necessarily
immune from the dictates of administrative procedure. See infra text accompanying notes 234–39.
154 See Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A
Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 35, 35 (1996) (referring to the APA as “the constitution of the
modern regulatory state”).
155 See, e.g., Renan, supra note 138, at 1113-14 (observing that, in the context of surveillance
technologies, those actually taking collection of the information will be closest to the technology in
question and to the specific circumstances of the situation).
156 See infra text accompanying notes 264–95.
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Before explaining this conclusion, a key predicate question must be
addressed: why haven’t police agencies been subject to the constraints of
administrative law already? If the analogy described above is so evident, why
hasn’t it been formally recognized by commentators or courts? Indeed, to the
extent the issue has been addressed, the accepted wisdom is directly to the
contrary. For instance, even though the Administrative Procedure Act does
not include law enforcement in its exemptions,157 the leading treatise on the
subject flatly states that “administrative law includes the entire range of action
by government with respect to the citizen or by the citizen with respect to
the government, except for those matters dealt with by the criminal law.”158
David Zaring has noted that, at the federal level, “[t]he DOJ . . . does not
make policy through the APA. Its important criminal law function is
regulated by the courts through criminal, rather than administrative,
procedure.”159 Despite the extensive efforts of well-known scholars such as
Kenneth Culp Davis and Anthony Amsterdam going back to the early
1970s,160 police agencies have for the most part remained immune from the
formal strictures of administrative statutes. Of course, most police
departments have some regulations, governing everything from use of deadly
force to traffic stops.161 But none of these rules are required to go through the
filter of the APA as occurs with other agencies.
This immunity from regulatory oversight, to the extent it is absolute, is
illegitimate for three reasons. First, virtually all other public officials have
always been subject to administrative law. The fact that police are exempt
appears to be an inadvertent byproduct of judicial constitutional activism and
our federalist structure rather than a considered policy development. Second,
despite the Fourth Amendment’s practical preemption of the field, the
Supreme Court’s cases—in particular, its inspection cases—can be
interpreted as a command that administrative law governs in the panvasive
context. And third, even if Fourth Amendment precedent is inapposite in this
setting, the generalized, prospective nature of panvasive searches and
seizures, as distinguished from suspicion-based searches and seizures,
requires that they function consistently with administrative law principles.

157 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (exempting Congress, the courts, governments of the territories,
certain banking functions, and the military from coverage).
158 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 1.1, at 1 (3d ed. 1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, New Trends in Administrative
Law, 6 MD. BAR J. 9, 9 (1974)).
159 David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 239 n.263 (2010).
160 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
161 See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and
Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 446 (1990)
(noting the increase in internal written police policies in the second half of the twentieth century).
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A. Police and the Development of Administrative Law
The term “new administrativist” implies, correctly, that regulating police
through administrative law is not a new idea. As early as 1903, Bruce Wyman
at Harvard Law School was asserting that police should be subject to the
constraints of administrative law.162 In his book published that year, The
Principles of the Administrative Law Governing the Relations of Public Officers, he
devoted sections to arrest and to seizure of property, and discussed the use of
force and warrant and cause requirements.163 While he recognized that the
latter requirements come from the “law of the land,” he saw administrative
rules as a way to mitigate their effect on officers who acted fairly.164
Fast forward to the 1970s when scholars such as Davis, Amsterdam, and
Judge Carl McGowan were advocating for application of administrative law
principles to the police,165 and several national organizations, including the
American Bar Association, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
and the International Association of Chiefs of Police made similar declarations.166
Probably best known is the work of Davis, who published Police Discretion in
1975, and an article making similar points the same year.167 Bemoaning the
fact that police are not governed by “the principles of administrative law,” he
argued that “administrative law thinking can be profitably applied to criminal
administration.”168 He went on to make several provocative assertions:
Five basic facts about police policy are astonishing: (1) Much of it is illegal or
of doubtful legality. (2) Subordinates at or near the bottom of the organization,
not top officers, make much of it. (3) Most of it is kept secret from those who
are affected by it. (4) Police policy is characteristically based on superficial
guesswork and hardly at all on systematic studies by staffs of qualified

162 See generally BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903).
163 See id. at 275-80 (discussing arrest and seizure of property); see also id. at 275 (stating that
an officer “may not use more force than is absolutely necessary”); id. at 276-77 (stating that an arrest
of a person who turns out to be innocent is nonetheless permissible if founded on probable cause to
believe a felony has been committed).
164 See id. at 277 (referring to rules governing police as “true rules of administrative law”).
165 See supra note 16.
166 See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4.3, at 19
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1974) (“Police discretion can best be structured and controlled through the process of
administrative rule-making by police agencies.”); NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS & GOALS, POLICE standard 1.3, at 22 (1973) (“Every police executive should formalize
procedures for developing and implementing . . . written agency policy.”); MODEL RULES FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS r. 6.10 (INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE 1972) (noting that
determinations about selective enforcement “should be made only through an established departmental
administrative rulemaking procedure which provides for citizen participation and judicial review”).
167 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); Davis, supra note 16.
168 Davis, supra note 16, at 703.
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specialists or on investigations like those conducted by our best administrative
agencies and legislative committees. (5) It is almost completely exempt from
the kind of limited judicial review deemed necessary for almost all other
administrative agencies.169

Davis’s hope was that courts would address this “astonishing” situation
through administrative law. In particular, he wanted to use administrative
principles to regulate what he called “selective enforcement,” the exercise of
discretion in deciding whom to arrest or search among those suspected of
violating the law.170
Between these publications of Wyman and Davis came a deluge of laws
meant to regulate the administrative lawmaking process, triggered in large part
by concern about the huge discretion wielded by New Deal agencies.171 Congress
enacted the federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946 and, within the next
few decades, every state followed suit, although their approaches did not always
mimic the federal statute.172 These administrative procedure acts were meant to
regularize rulemaking and adjudication by administrative agencies, increase
agency accountability, ensure an opportunity for public input during agency
rulemaking deliberations, and reduce, in the federal APA’s words, “arbitrary” and
“capricious” conduct by the agencies.173 By the time Davis was writing, courts had
produced a considerable amount of case law exploring the role of the courts in
ensuring agencies followed these statutes. Davis pointed in particular to Supreme
Court and lower court decisions that had required agencies to develop
“ascertainable standards” governing their discretionary actions.174 Although none
169
170

Id. at 703-04.
See id. at 705 (arguing that “rulemaking can reach all police activities, including the vital
subject of selective enforcement”).
171 See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996) (recounting the legislative reaction to New
Deal legislation).
172 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.13, at 32-33 (3d ed. 1991) (noting
that, as of 1991, thirty states and the District of Columbia followed the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act, which is similar to the federal APA, and twenty other states had similar
administrative procedure laws); Bonfield, supra note 153, at 297 (noting that the states “adopted many
of the general concepts embodied in the 1946 federal Administrative Procedure Act”).
173 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.1, at 29 (3d ed. 2014) (stating that the federal APA “requires that
rulemaking be participatory and comprehensive” as well as “demonstrably rational”); William Funk,
Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 154-55 (1991)
(discussing rationality review of agency rulemaking in the states).
174 Davis, supra note 16, at 708 (quoting Holmes v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d
Cir. 1968)). Davis also cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974),
which held that “[t]he agency must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to
assure that it is being applied consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of
arbitrary denial . . . to potential beneficiaries.” Davis, supra note 16, at 710. Davis also claimed to
have collected more than a dozen cases requiring administrative rulemaking. Id. at 709-10.
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of these cases involved the police, Davis believed they stood for the proposition
that any administrator, including a police administrator, “violates due process if
he fails to confine and structure his discretion to the extent required to avoid
unnecessary arbitrariness in the choices made.”175
Since Davis wrote, judicially required administrative rulemaking and
judicial review of those rules have burgeoned.176 Yet, police agencies have
remained largely unaffected by these developments, and the courts have not
picked up on Davis’s suggestion. Nor have the arguments of the new
administrativists fared any better.
One set of explanations for this void might focus on ways in which the
function of the police differs from that of other agencies. Arguments along
these lines would suggest that intermeddling with police work by inexpert
judges will lead to particularly costly mistakes (including needless loss of life),
or that police need more speed and flexibility than other public officials and
therefore cannot be saddled with rulemaking requirements.177 Another concern,
often voiced by police themselves, is that police decisionmaking requires
greater secrecy than is typically permitted in an administrative law regime.178
None of these attempts at distinguishing police agencies from other
agencies works. Judicial second-guessing of agency decisions can exact
enormous costs in a host of other settings involving, for instance, pollution,
food, and health regulations, yet judicial review persists in all of them.179 Speed
and flexibility are important in connection with any number of executive
branch activities, ranging from environmental protection to health-related
matters to financial regulation, and the relevant agencies have managed to
function despite rulemaking requirements; furthermore, of course, rules can
account for emergency situations and unforeseen circumstances.180 And any
175
176

Id. at 708.
See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 173, § 3.3 n.28 (citing cases requiring publication of
general rules of eligibility, entitlement to government benefits, and “articulated standards”).
177 These concerns, among others, have been associated with other executive endeavors that are not
subject to administrative control. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign
Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1935-46 (2015) (arguing that these and related concerns do not
justify exempting foreign affairs from the accountability associated with administrative principles).
178 See Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 119 (1983) (describing a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) study finding that the release of training manuals and investigative reports “has apparently
served to educate and enlighten the criminal element in many of the subtle aspects of DEA’s
undercover operations, including the use of informants, surveillance techniques, and the technical
aspects of many of DEA’s more sophisticated investigative techniques”).
179 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 177, at 1946 (providing examples, including judicial
evaluation of agency decisions about clean air, cigarette smoking, and expansion of health care).
180 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11
and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1636-39 (2009) (noting how, in the
modern administrative state, the executive and administrative agencies have been “the main crisis
managers” of national security threats after 9/11 and of the financial meltdown of 2008).
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police need for secrecy can be accommodated. For instance, the federal APA
and most state APAs provide that police agencies need not disclose, in the federal
APA’s words, “techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, or . . . guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law.”181 Note, however, that this provision, which is part
of the Freedom of Information Act,182 does not exempt police from the rest
of the APA; rather, it only permits nondisclosure of a “selective enforcement”
policy, of the type Davis advocated, that would tip off potential criminals
about whom the police will target.
In short, nothing about the police function suggests police agencies should be
treated differently than other agencies. One might nonetheless conjecture two
other reasons why the police are left alone by administrative jurisprudence. First
is the fact that most policing in the United States is local. The lion’s share of
searches and seizures, especially those that are suspicion-based, are carried out by
municipal and county authorities, not federal agents or state police.183 Yet the
federal APA applies only to federal agencies, and municipal agencies are not
necessarily covered by state APAs. Although I argue below that even local police
agencies usually should be covered by their state’s APA,184 the local nature of
policing may have stymied easy application of APA-like procedure.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, administrative law may have had a
minimal impact on the police because police regulation has been dominated
by the Fourth Amendment, at least after Mapp v. Ohio applied the exclusionary
rule to the states.185 Since that 1961 decision, the Supreme Court has handed
down hundreds of opinions with nationwide application on the warrant
requirement and its exceptions,186 the definitions of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion,187 and the application of the exclusionary rule.188
Probably no other type of agency work is so heavily surrounded by
constitutional doctrine. The ubiquity and scope of this jurisprudence make it
easy to assume that the Fourth Amendment—along with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments—has occupied the field of police regulation.

181
182
183

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
ROY ROBERG, KENNETH NOVAK & GARY CORDNER, POLICE & SOCIETY 16 (4th ed.
2008) (“Local police, when compared with state and federal law enforcement, have the most
employees, cost the most money, respond to a majority of police-related problems, and tend to have
a closer relationship with citizens.”).
184 See infra text accompanying notes 234–39.
185 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
186 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2007).
187 Id.
188 Id.
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The fact remains that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has left
considerable room for experimentation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized as much in a series of cases, all of which involve panvasive actions.
B. Supreme Court Case Law Redux
A clear goal of all of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases is to
avoid anything smacking of the “general warrant,” the term used to describe
government authorizations that give complete discretion to officers in the
field, and the one type of government action that every court and scholar
agrees is barred by the amendment.189 The traditional antidote to the general
warrant is the specific warrant, describing with particularity the person or
items for which the government has suspicion.190 There are good historical
and normative reasons for ensuring that the specific warrant, or at least some
sort of ex ante determination of suspicion, is the default protection against
infringements on interests that are clearly fundamental; as I have argued
elsewhere, these fundamental interests would include the ransacking of
homes, investigatory detentions and arrests of individuals, and certain other
particularly intrusive government actions.191 But these reasons usually do not
apply in the panvasive cases addressed by the courts, and some regulatory
mechanism other than the specific warrant can be contemplated. Several of the
passages in these cases suggest—although admittedly they do not hold—that
the mechanism should be administrative law.
A largely unnoticed aspect of the Supreme Court’s business inspection
cases is that many of them reference administrative law principles and appear
to incorporate them as Fourth Amendment requirements. For instance, in
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Court stated that, to protect business owners
from the “unbridled discretion [of] executive and administrative officers,” the
judiciary must ensure that there are “reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an inspection . . . with respect to a particular

189 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 583 (1999) (“No one questions that the Framers despised and sought to ban general warrants.”).
190 See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1253 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“To
prevent the issue of general warrants . . . the Framers established the inviolable principle that . . .
‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the . . . things to
be seized.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend IV)).
191 Slobogin, supra note 136, at 1738-42. In making this argument, I rely on both JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), and BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). In particular, Ackerman’s “constitutional
moments” thesis is useful in explaining why, even if legislatively approved, nonfacilitative panvasive
searches of the home and seizures of people are unconstitutional. See ACKERMAN, supra; cf. Riley v.
California, 135 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that searches of cell phones require a warrant);
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) (prohibiting dragnet seizures).
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[establishment].”192 In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court upheld a mine inspection
program because the statute
requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of
inspection. . . . [T]he standards with which a mine operator is required to
comply are all specifically set forth in the [Mine Safety] Act or in . . . the Code
of Federal Regulations. . . . [R]ather than leaving the frequency and purpose of
inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government officers, the [program]
establishes a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence.193

Even in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, perhaps the least fulsome
opinion in this category of cases, the Court said, in the course of authorizing
warrantless inspections of liquor stores, “Where Congress has authorized
inspection but made no rules governing the procedure that inspectors must
follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive rules apply.”194 These
various statements indicate that administrative law can perform the
Constitution’s regulatory function if the legislature or agency in fact promulgates
constraining rules.195 They also suggest that if the agency does develop such rules,
it has established a safe harbor from aggressive judicial intervention.
The Court’s cases outside the inspection context do not make similar
explicit reference to administrative regulation. But, as Part I made clear, most
of the Court’s panvasive search and seizure cases resonate with the inspection
cases in their insistence on regularization, either through standardized
procedures, control by superiors, or both. More specifically, one can glean
from the Court’s panvasive search and seizure cases—including those outside
the inspection setting—the goal of avoiding four overlapping types of
government abuse: (1) capricious searches and seizures that are based on
inarticulate hunches or whim rather than neutral criteria; (2) biased searches
and seizures, based on irrelevant criteria associated with discriminatory abuse
or simple malice; (3) pretextual searches and seizures that use the program as
an excuse for action in the absence of individualized suspicion; and (4) ultra
vires searches and seizures that go beyond the original investigative purpose
of the search or seizure (sometimes called “mission creep”).
For instance, the Court’s checkpoint cases censure “random” stops and
stops based on arbitrary grounds,196 and the Court’s drug testing decisions
192
193
194
195

436 U.S. 307, 320, 323 (1978) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
452 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1981).
397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (“In the context of a regulatory
inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality
of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.”).
196 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39, 44 (2000) (affirming Prouse’s holding
declaiming “standardless and unconstrained discretion” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
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and King’s holding about DNA stress the limited discretion afforded
government officials in those cases.197 Likewise, Patel explained its decision
requiring precompliance review of nonconsensual hotel registry searches as a
hedge against harassment.198 Patel also suggested such review would curb
pretextual actions.199 Several other Court opinions, including Edmond, have
declared that pretext arguments must be entertained in the panvasive search
and seizure context, in direct contrast to the rule when the avowed reason for
a search and seizure is individualized suspicion.200 And concern about mission
creep is reflected in the Court’s emphasis in its drug testing cases that the
blood samples be used only for determining impairment,201 and its
assumption in King that DNA samples do not reveal genetic traits and are
unlikely to disclose private medical information.202
Given the Court’s concern about abuses of discretion, why hasn’t it
contemplated resorting to administrative law outside of a subset of its
inspection cases? Perhaps it is easier to think of searches and seizures of
businesses as an administrative endeavor because they occur pursuant to
statute and are carried out by officials who are not police. But neither aspect
of inspections distinguishes them from other panvasive actions. Federal

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979))); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
558-59 (1976) (reiterating that “random roving-patrol stops [cannot] be tolerated because they ‘would
subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers.’” (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975))).
197 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (“[I]n light of the
standardized nature of the [drug] tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with
administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.”); see also
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (quoting Skinner).
198 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452-53 (2015) (“Absent an opportunity
for precompliance review, the ordinance creates an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will
exceed statutory limits, or be used as a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests.”).
199 Id.
200 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45 (distinguishing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996),
which prohibits pretext arguments when the police can justify the search and seizure on
individualized suspicion, from roadblock scenarios where no suspicion exists); see also New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987) (emphasizing that the statute was not enacted “as a ‘pretext’ to
enable law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal law violations”); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (stating that “there is no suggestion whatever that this standard
procedure . . . was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive”). Whren itself recognized the
distinction. See 517 U.S. at 811 (distinguishing Whren from Burger and Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367
(1987), by noting that the latter involved searches “conducted in the absence of probable cause”).
201 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 n.7 (“While this procedure permits the Government to
learn certain private medical facts that an employee might prefer not to disclose, there is no
indication that the Government . . . uses the information for any other purpose. Under the
circumstances, we do not view this procedure as a significant invasion of privacy.”).
202 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasizing that “the CODIS loci come from noncoding parts
of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee”).
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regulations were the basis for the drug testing program in Skinner,203 a state
law established the DNA program in King,204 and local legislation often
authorizes camera surveillance and other types of panvasive actions.205
Immigration officials were in charge of the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte,206
and school officials supervised the drug tests in Vernonia.207 The DNA
sampling and testing in King were carried out by correctional officials.208
Perhaps the judicial intuition is the slightly different notion that businesses
are “pervasively regulated,” whereas private citizens are not. But even if this
were true (it turns out to be an interesting question),209 this distinction
supports an argument for less protection for businesses than for individuals, not
more. Yet it is only in panvasive cases involving businesses that the Court
explicitly recognizes the relevance of statutory and administrative regulation.
If such regulation is necessary in the inspection cases, it ought to be the
minimum requirement in all other panvasive search and seizure cases.
C. The Structure of Administrative Law and of Policing
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent lays important
groundwork for the argument that administrative law principles are relevant
to panvasive searches and seizures. However, that precedent does not
establish what those principles might look like. Either explicitly or implicitly,
many of the Supreme Court’s decisions have referenced administrative law
principles such as regularization and discretion-reduction in analyzing how
the Fourth Amendment applies in the panvasive setting. But the fact remains
that none of these cases, not even the inspection decisions, mentions the APA
or analogous statutes, or the law construing or expanding upon those statutes.
Nor, as noted earlier, have these statutes typically been viewed as applicable
to the police.210
203 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608 (citing regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad
Administration, at 49 C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(1) (1987), as the law governing the drug testing program).
204 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (citing the Maryland DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY § 2–504(a)(3)(i) (Lexis 2011), as the law governing the testing program).
205 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CCTV: DEVELOPING PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES
6 (2007) (recounting the practices of several cities and towns regarding camera surveillance); see also
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34 (noting that the roadblock program was established by the city of
Indianapolis); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (indicating that the local
school board established the school drug test policy).
206 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-46 (1976).
207 515 U.S. at 650.
208 See 133 S. Ct. at 1966 (stating that “booking personnel” took the buccal swab in King’s case).
209 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy’s Problem, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1079,
1096 (1995) (“[T]he logic of Burger [(the junkyard inspection case)] can be extended to automobiles
or, indeed, to almost anything else. After all, there is no constitutional right to sidewalks; in
principle, walking on sidewalks could be treated as a highly regulated activity.” (footnote omitted)).
210 See supra text accompanying notes 157–61.
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This is an oversight, but it is understandable, given traditional views on
how the police function interacts with the structure of administrative law. The
APA categorizes agency actions into four types.211 Formal rules are rules that
the governing statute requires the agency to produce through a trial-like
proceeding.212 An informal rule is any other “agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency.”213 Formal adjudication, like formal rulemaking,
is also provided for by statute and allows for resolution of disputes under
agency rules through a quasi-judicial process, akin to a trial.214 Finally,
informal adjudication consists of virtually any other agency action, whether
it involves allocation of resources, promises, threats, negotiation, or, most
important here, investigation.215 Unlike the other three categories, the APA
imposes “few, if any, requirements on informal adjudication” and, indeed,
“barely acknowledges the concept.”216 Ed Rubin has argued that informal
adjudication is more accurately labeled simply “executive action.”217
Traditional, suspicion-based searches and seizures—including decisions
that selectively enforce criminal statutes in the way that concerned Davis—fit
most readily into the latter box. Such actions do not have “general effect” like
a rule does, but rather are akin to informal executive branch “adjudication,”
either by a police officer or a magistrate. The typical decision about whether
there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest, search, stop, or frisk
an individual is a case-specific determination.218 If this is the type of police
work at issue, it is not surprising that the APA would not be considered
applicable. That is not to say that this type of police work should be exempt
from administrative oversight,219 only that such oversight is not required by

211
212

See The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 705 (1947).
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (defining a formal rule as one “required by statute to be made
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”).
213 Id. § 551(4).
214 Id. § 554(a).
215 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5, at 156 (4th ed.
2002) (stating that informal adjudications constitute “the largest class of federal agency actions” and
providing examples).
216 Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 108 (2003).
217 Id. at 109.
218 See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 94 (1979) (“Where the standard is probable cause, a
search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that
person . . . . The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less
than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked . . . .”).
219 Cf. Friedman & Stein, supra note 1, at 285-86 (arguing for administrative rulemaking across
the board); see also infra text accompanying notes 313–14.
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the current APA framework, which generally gives a wide berth to
enforcement actions by agencies.220
In contrast, a panvasive search and seizure program—establishing
checkpoints, drug testing, inspections, and the like—is best viewed as the
kind of general, prospective directive established by administrative rules. As
defined at the beginning of this Article and fleshed out since, panvasive
searches and seizures are based on a policy, aimed at groups, and, most
importantly, applicable despite the complete absence of particularized
suspicion concerning the people affected.221 To use language often associated
with administrative rulemaking, such programs directly affect “individual
rights and obligations,” such as driving, going to school, and using banks.222
Because they impose costs on legitimate activities unmediated through an
officer’s judgment about individual wrongdoing, panvasive searches and
seizures differ from suspicion-based policing in the same way that rulemaking
differs from adjudication. Thus, these interventions should only be permitted
if they are subject to the vetting and procedural restrictions that apply to
other agency rulemaking.
An administrative law buff might nonetheless object that panvasive police
policies do not fit the commonly accepted paradigm of legislative rulemaking.
Typically, an agency rule is legislative only if it tells private citizens and
companies what they may and may not do.223 One might argue that search and
seizure policies are more aptly described, in administrative law parlance, as
“internal” or “housekeeping” rules—rules that govern agency operatives224—or
“interpretive rules”—rules that spell out an agency’s interpretation of a statute
or court ruling225—neither of which are subject to the same degree of regulation
as legislative rules.
Even assuming these distinctions are coherent,226 once again they justify,
at most, exempting suspicion-based searches and seizures from the APA’s
220 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (“The agency is far better equipped than
the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”).
221 See supra text accompanying notes 5–6.
222 See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 172-73 (2007) (associating
notice-and-comment rulemaking with a regulation that “directly governs the conduct of members
of the public, ‘affecting individual rights and obligations’” (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 302 (1979))); see also infra note 228.
223 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 172, at 5 (noting that regulatory agencies are vested with
“authority to prescribe generally what shall or shall not be done” in ways that “impinge upon private
rights and regulate the manner in which those rights may be exercised”).
224 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012) (excluding from coverage “matter[s] relating to agency
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts”).
225 See id. § 553(b)(3) (“[T]his subsection does not apply . . . to interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice . . . .”).
226 But see David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278-79 (2010) (“There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in the field of
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purview. In the suspicion-based search and seizure setting, the relevant legal
rules are concededly aimed at the police; the obligations imposed on private
citizens come not from those rules but from criminal statutes. As long as
citizens obey the criminal law, or at least do not arouse suspicion that they
are violating that law, they may not be subjected to a search or seizure. The
restrictions imposed by the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
requirements, in turn, are meant to speak to the police about when they may
enforce the criminal law, and thus any rule that the police devise to operationalize
these requirements could plausibly be said to be internal or interpretive.227
In contrast, panvasive search and seizure policies are like statutes that
directly regulate the public. In these regimes, citizens are told they must
submit to an inspection, checkpoint, or drug testing program or expose their
information to the government, not because a criminal statute says so—citizens
cannot avoid a panvasive search and seizure even if they completely abjure
suspicious behavior—but because the panvasive policy dictates it. While the
policy also governs the police, it is directed at the public.
In short, unlike internal or interpretive rules, panvasive search and seizure
policies prospectively affect the “rights and obligations” of the citizenry,228 both
individually and as a group. In fact, they do so to a much greater extent than
many other policies that are considered “rules” under the APA. For instance,
the APA requires that agencies abide by its rulemaking dictates when dealing
with such matters as workplace ergonomics, the height of a fence around
animals, and the precise manner in which farm yields are reported.229 A regime
administrative law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between legislative and
nonlegislative rules. . . . [C]ourts have labeled the distinction . . . ‘tenuous,’ ‘baffling,’ and
‘enshrouded in considerable smog.’”). Criticism of this lax treatment of internal rules has been robust
even in the typical administrative context. See Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative”
Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 4 (1994) (noting the frequent
criticisms of the distinctions as ‘fuzzy’ or ‘enshrouded in considerable fog’”).
227 Indeed, Davis himself thought that selective enforcement rules should probably be
classified as “interpretive rules,” see DAVIS, supra note 167, at 110, which, as noted above, supra note
225 and accompanying text, are rules that state what the administrative officer thinks the statute or
regulation means and are exempt from notice-and-comment requirements. See also Friedman &
Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1857 (“For the most part, police rules are internal—they simply
instruct police officers how they must go about enforcing the laws already in place. Rules contained
in a police manual may be binding on individual officers, but the police are not permitted to make
members of the general public do (or abstain from doing) anything not already written into the
substantive law.” (footnote omitted)).
228 See Davidson v. Glickman, 169 F.3d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Interpretive rules state what
the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means, while legislative rules ‘affect[]
individual rights and obligations’ and create law.” (citations omitted)).
229 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211-13 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(holding that a directive regarding workplace ergonomics and the handling of materials in certain types
of industries was not a mere “procedural rule” or “general statement of policy” exempt from APA
notice-and-comment requirements, but rather a substantive rule, before promulgation of which the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration was required to conduct a notice-and-comment
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that requires the relevant agency to submit to administrative law constraints in
these situations, but not when police want to require citizens to submit to drug
testing, checkpoints, and surveillance, is seriously askew.
Taken together, the history and rationale of administrative law, allusions
in the Court’s inspection cases, and the structure of panvasive actions support
the proposition that, when carrying out such actions, police ought to be
governed by administrative law. At the same time, as the Supreme Court
suggested in Colonnade, a rule that has cleared the relevant administrative law
hurdles might provide a constitutional safe harbor230—a domain in which
police deserve to exercise discretion because they have followed a process for
limiting it. The remainder of this Article fleshes out what these hurdles might
be and how they might function in the panvasive setting.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A VEHICLE FOR
REGULATING THE POLICE
On the assumption that administrative law principles should apply to
panvasive actions administered by police agencies just as it would to other
government agencies, this Part will use the Administrative Procedure Act and
subsequent judicial interpretations of its application at the federal level as the
template for discussing the types of restrictions that administrative law might
place on panvasive police actions. The APA, as amended, has three central
objectives: (1) to subject agency actions to public scrutiny; (2) to establish
requirements for rulemaking and adjudication; and (3) to provide a method
of challenging agency action in court on constitutional or statutory grounds,
including claims that the APA itself has been violated.231 The courts and
Congress have added significant gloss to the APA, particularly with respect
to judicial review of agency actions and legislative or executive overview of
rulemaking proceeding); see also Davidson, 169 F.3d at 999 (finding that a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
handbook provision regarding the method of reporting use of farm acreage affected individual rights
and thus qualified as a legislative rule that required notice and comment); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
82 F.3d 165, 1771-72 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Department of Agriculture guidance regulating fence
height for “dangerous” animals was a legislative rule requiring notice-and-comment procedure); Cmty.
Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concluding that Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) action levels for contaminants were legislative rules subject to notice-and-comment
requirements); Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, No. 10-1941, 2010 WL 4116892, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010)
(finding that a notice to lessees and operators of mobile offshore drilling units setting forth new safety
measures for oil rigs was a substantive rule that required notice and comment).
230 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970); see also supra text
accompanying note 194. A few scholars have recognized that good faith legislative or administrative
attempts to solve a problem might be treated as a safe harbor against constitutional attack. See, e.g.,
Rappaport, supra note 138, at 208 (“[T]he Court could offer a ‘safe harbor’ of relaxed constitutional
scrutiny to jurisdictions that voluntarily adopt and comply with reforms . . . .”).
231 See Rubin, supra note 216, at 100-01 (setting forth these three aims of the regime established
by the APA).
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those actions.232 The most pertinent aspects of this body of law for panvasive
police conduct are the notice-and-comment requirement, the requirement
that rules be adequately explained in writing, the requirement that rules be
implemented evenhandedly, and the requirement that rules not exceed the
relevant legislative authorization.233
One caveat to the notion that administrative law principles such as these
ought to apply to the police is that the majority of police departments are
municipal, local entities,234 yet most municipalities are not governed by APA-like
statutes.235 Further, even if they were governed by such a statute, many of
these municipalities run small departments that might have great difficulty
constructing and explaining rules, as required by notice-and-comment and
other administrative procedure mandates.236
The latter problem can largely be addressed by allowing smaller departments
to piggyback on policies developed by their larger counterparts and other policy
organs.237 The first objection is more substantial, but not fatal. Not only should
federal, state, and county police be governed by the relevant APA, but municipal
police departments should be as well, at least to the extent they are carrying out
panvasive actions in service of state or federal criminal law rather than a purely
local statute; under those circumstances they are functioning like an agency of
those entities.238 That would mean that, even if carried out by local authorities,
checkpoints aimed at drug and alcohol interdiction, most drug testing
programs, many inspection programs, and most surveillance would be governed
by the notice-and-comment, explanation, implementation, and authorization
requirements discussed here.239
232
233

See generally infra text accompanying notes 264–95.
See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 173, at 37-39, 445-49 (explaining the first two components);
see also infra text accompanying notes 282, 296–97 (explaining the last two components).
234 Of the approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies, almost 13,000 are local, rather than
county, state, or federal. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN
INTRODUCTION 63 (8th ed. 2013).
235 Note, however, that the biggest cities usually have such statutes. E.g., N.Y.C. CHARTER ch.
45, §§ 1041–47 (2004).
236 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1886-89 (noting that almost half of
American police departments have fewer than ten full-time officers, and describing the difficulty of
imposing administrative rulemaking obligations on a small municipal police force).
237 For instance, the Constitution Project has developed detailed guidelines for the fusion
centers and camera systems discussed later in this Article. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra
note 86; see also infra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.
238 Further, in at least nine states, municipalities are considered agencies of the state. See 1
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.8.10 (3d ed. 1999) (“[A
municipal corporation] is variously described as an arm of the state, a miniature state, an
instrumentality of the state, an agency of the state, and the like.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
239 Residential and business inspections are the one major exception; such inspections
generally stem from local ordinances rather than state or federal policy. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (involving a routine inspection for possible violations of San Francisco’s
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In the following survey of how these requirements would apply to
panvasive searches and seizures, three sorts of modern programs—involving
physical surveillance, datamining, and physical seizures—can serve as
illustrations of how they might play out in practice. The first type of program
is well-represented by the Domain Awareness operation that has existed in
New York City since 2012.240 Among other things, this brainchild of the New
York Police Department and Microsoft endeavors to collate and provide to
officers in the field information about public activities gleaned from
thousands of surveillance cameras, geospatial data that reveals crime “hot
spots,” feeds from license recognition systems, and GPS signals that permit
real-time and historical tracking of cars.241 Domain Awareness is
representative of numerous other types of physical monitoring systems,
including a recent surge in wide-ranging drone surveillance.242 The second
type of program—known as the “fusion center”—exists in well over half of
the states, and uses computers to collect financial, rental, utility, vehicle, and
communications data from federal, state, and local public databases, law
enforcement files, and private companies in an effort to identify suspicious
individuals or provide information on already-identified suspects.243 Fusion
centers are, in essence, junior versions of the NSA metadata program and
similar federal record-collection efforts.244 The third illustrative program,
representative of panvasive seizures rather than searches, is a discontinued
District of Columbia police department “Neighborhood Safety Zone” policy
permitting checkpoints at roads leading into neighborhoods thought to be
experiencing extreme violence, at which drivers were asked why they wanted
Housing Code). Although efforts to combat local crime are burgeoning, they tend to be
implemented through suspicion-based policing. See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of
Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1416-19 (2001) (describing the increasing use of
criminal law by cities and towns).
240 See Colleen Long, NYPD, Microsoft Create Crime-Fighting Tech System, YAHOO! NEWS (Feb.
20, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/news/nypd-microsoft-create-crime-fighting-tech-system-174310276
—finance.html?ref=gs [https://perma.cc/T43E-Q5T5] (describing New York City’s Domain
Awareness System).
241 Id.; see also New York Police Department, Public Security Privacy Guidelines (Apr. 2, 2009),
www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NA8D-MS26] [hereinafter Guidelines] (describing the contours and legal
authority for the program).
242 On the increase in drone surveillance and attempts to regulate it, see generally Marc
Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson & Joseph Thai, Regulating Drones Under the
First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015).
243 See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUSION CENTERS:
PRESERVING PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE PROTECTING AGAINST CRIME & TERRORISM
4 (2012), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D3KHXXH] (describing the establishment of seventy-seven fusion centers nationwide and the types of
information these centers collect).
244 See id. (discussing the role of fusion centers).
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to enter the neighborhood and could be denied entrance if the police decided
their reason was not “legitimate.”245
An initial issue is how these programs prospectively affect individual
rights and obligations in a way that triggers the administrative rulemaking
process. While the answer to that question is clear with respect to the stops
that occurred under the D.C. program, given a roadblock’s interference with
autonomy,246 it may not be as obvious in connection with the two surveillance
programs. Channeling the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases,247 one
could argue that those panvasive programs affect no important interests
because they neither physically intrude on nor directly coerce citizens; they
simply collect information, usually from publicly available sources. But the
fact remains that, like a roadblock policy, a surveillance program influences
people’s legitimate activities. To avoid the impact of such a program, one
would have to sacrifice traveling in numerous public spaces and engaging in
many public and private transactions; since such activities are usually
unavoidable, the more likely outcome is that the existence of surveillance will
modify how those activities are carried out.248 Thus, the Domain Awareness
and fusion center programs do affect those subject to surveillance, even
though no physical intrusion or direct coercion is involved.249
A. Notice and Comment
Under the APA, if an agency engages in informal rulemaking, it must
issue a generally available notice of “either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”250 The goal
is to permit public comment on the proposed rule or rule change, and thereby
245 Maria Glod, Federal Courts Say D.C. Police Checkpoints Were Unconstitutional, WASH. POST
(July 11, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/10/AR200907100
2750.html [https://perma.cc/68MV-D9R7].
246 See Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating, in the
course of assessing the constitutionality of the D.C. program, that “roadside checkpoints, however
brief, intrude on motorists’ ‘right of “free passage without interruption”’ and ‘arguably on their right
to personal security’” (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976))),
rev’d, 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
247 See supra note 8.
248 Cf. Sean Gallagher, Mall Owners Pull Plug on Cellular Tracking (For Now), WIRED (Nov. 29,
2011, 11:11 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/11/mall-pull-plug-cell-tracking [https://
perma.cc/5DJN-TA8W] (describing the outcry over and eventual termination of a program that
used cell phone signals to track the activities of shoppers, with Senator Charles Schumer objecting
that people could only opt out of the tracking by turning off their cell phones).
249 For more discussion of how surveillance influences the public’s behavior and how this
influence relates to standing issues, see Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42
PEPP. L. REV. 517, 530-44 (2015), which provides several reasons why “chilling” arguments should
lead to Article III standing.
250 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012).
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improve the agency’s decisionmaking process and enhance political
legitimacy.251 Case law establishes that if the agency fails to pinpoint critical
issues covered by the proposed rule and identified in comments, any regulation
that results can be challenged in court and nullified.252
Application of this rule in the panvasive search and seizure setting could
not but help democratize the process. As Eric Miller has written, unlike the
rulemaking of other agencies,
police rulemaking is most often not open to [the] public . . . . The resulting
policy is often based solely on [the police’s] own internal assessment of the
appropriate goals and values to pursue, independent of the interests of the
community they police. Departmental policy-makers thus remain remote from
the community, looking inwards rather than outwards to determine the
proposed policy’s social and criminological impact. Given this feature of police
policy-making, community members lack the ability to participate in—and
especially, to challenge—police policy at the front-end during the equivalent of
the drafting and comment process.253

Consistent with these observations, programs like Domain Awareness, fusion
centers, and neighborhood blockades are often simply sprung on the public,254
or in the case of at least some fusion centers, never formally presented to the
public at all.255 Nor were most of the panvasive policies involved in the Supreme
Court’s cases subject to any type of pre-initiation debate.256
Application of the APA would have a dramatic impact on the usual
cloistered police policymaking process.257 For instance, despite numerous
251 See Rubin, supra note 216, at 113 (“The entire point of the comment process is to effect changes
in the proposed rule. Agency rulemaking is a policy process that should involve the collection of new
information and the use of that information to design optimal solutions.” (footnote omitted)).
252 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (enjoining the
Department of Labor from adopting a new rule because the Secretary failed to comply with the
notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act).
253 Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 522-23 (2015) (footnote omitted).
254 See, e.g., Long, supra note 240 (quoting the director of the NYPD counterterrorism program as
stating that the domain awareness program “was created by cops for cops” and remarking that “the latest
version has been quietly in use for about a year”); see also Glod, supra note 245 (indicating that residents
were surprised and upset by the roadblock in the Trinidad neighborhood of Washington, D.C.).
255 Cf. Slobogin, supra note 136, at 1751 (stating that, in most jurisdictions where fusion centers
operate, “no local legislative body has debated the purpose or scope of fusion-center operation”).
256 There were some exceptions, however. For instance, the school district in Vernonia
presented the proposed drug testing policy at a “parent input” night, where the parents who were
in attendance gave unanimous approval. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-650
(1995). More common is the process in Sitz, where a task force composed of police, prosecutors, and
state transportation department officials created the policy without public consultation. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
257 Miller is pessimistic about the capacity of the notice-and-comment procedure to encourage
full public participation. See Miller, supra note 253, at 548 (“[Notice and comment] does little, on its
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news stories about domain awareness programs and fusion centers, we still do
not know the extent to which New York City is keeping tabs on its citizens,
or the precise types of records (such as bank accounts, medical documents,
communication logs?) that fusion centers are compiling.258 Requiring a
notice-and-comment period or something like it would mandate transparency
about these types of issues and at least a patina of democratic participation.259
In particular, it could provide concrete testimony about what Jane Bambauer
has called the “hassle” associated with panvasive programs—the extent to
which a program will affect innocent members of the public in its efforts to
catch bad actors.260
A perennial concern of the police—and one reason their rulemaking is so
secretive—is that knowledge of their tactics will tip off criminals and
undermine crime detection efforts; indeed, as noted earlier, the APA itself
accommodates police in this respect.261 But in the panvasive context, this
concern is highly exaggerated. First, of course, the primary aim of panvasive
search and seizure programs such as roadblocks, drug testing, and inspections

own . . . . What more is needed is to have the community actually participate, and have the
institution take them seriously . . . .”). Others are concerned that the feedback it produces will come
too late in the process. See Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 404 (2010)
(suggesting that information obtained in the notice-and-comment period would be more valuable
before any proposed rule was formulated). But some participation is better than none, and agencies
are not prevented from revising rules after receiving comments. Erik Luna laid out the basic
chronology as “(1) preparation of enforcement principles, (2) publication and invitation for comments,
(3) public deliberation in an open forum, (4) revision based on the comments, (5) publication of the
final principles, and (6) inculcation of the principles among rank-and-file officers.” Luna, supra note
138, at 603-04.
258 See, e.g., Torin Monahan & Neal A. Palmer, The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers, 40
SECURITY DIALOGUE 617, 630 (2009) (quoting one fusion center trainer as saying, “If people knew
what we were looking at, they’d throw a fit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
259 A formal notice-and-comment procedure may not be required before promulgation of
many panvasive policies. See William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law,
78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61-62 (2015) (noting that the overriding goal sought by
administrative principles is bureaucratic transparency, rather than adherence to formal process).
Further, it would make no sense to require such a procedure before every particular panvasive action.
For instance, a departmental decision to deploy extra officers at a given location or the siting of a
particular roadblock should be consistent with an ex ante policy and should be subject to ex post
review on antidiscrimination grounds, see infra text accompanying notes 282–94, but could of course
take place without a notice-and-comment period.
260 See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2015) (defining “hassle” as “the
chance that the police will stop or search an innocent person against his will”); cf. Martin Kaste, In
‘Domain Awareness,’ Detractors See Another NSA, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2014, 4:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/02/21/280749781/in-domain-awareness-detractorssee-another-nsa [https://perma.cc/J6CZ-NCDM] (describing controversy over Oakland’s domain
awareness program, the nature of which was initially hidden from the public, and noting that the
program may be scaled back as a result).
261 See supra text accompanying note 181.
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is deterrence, which publicity can only enhance. Second, matters of specific
implementation need not be disclosed. For instance, if camera surveillance is
meant to be covert, the fact and general area of such surveillance should be
disclosed, but exact camera locations need not be. Similarly, the types of
records sought by fusion centers should be revealed, but the algorithms that
might be used to analyze them need not be. And only the approximate
number and location of inspection checks or drug tests, not their precise
timing, would have to be revealed to the public. Third, and most importantly,
police should have to accept the fact that they function in a democracy.262
Democratic accountability—a key value sought to be implemented by
administrative law—requires that the public be told not only what panvasive
capacities police have, but also how those capacities will be used.263
B. Explanation of the Policy
A much discussed issue in administrative law circles is the extent to which
an agency must take public comments into consideration and, when it does
not follow the route suggested by a comment, explain why it failed to do so.264
The APA does not require a response to every comment; demanding that an
agency answer all of the submissions it receives, regardless of coherence or
number, would be inefficient and unproductive.265 At the same time, the APA
does state that agency rules and their underlying findings may not be
“arbitrary” or “capricious.”266
The Supreme Court’s solution to this dilemma has been to require a
written rationale for rules the agency promulgates, and require as well that
the rationale link the agency’s evidence, policies, and actions in a cogent
way.267 Thus, courts are entitled to ensure that agencies have taken a “hard
look” at the rules they generate. As Kevin Stack states:
262 See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 157-58 (2008) (defending
the idea that policing practices and fundamental aspects of democracy are irretrievably linked).
263 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1832 (“It is both unacceptable and unwise for
policing to remain aloof from the democratic processes that apply to the rest of agency government.”).
264 See Rubin, supra note 216, at 115-17 (discussing the difficulty courts face in defining which
comments an agency must respond to when rulemaking).
265 The APA requires that the rules incorporate “a concise general statement of [their] basis
and purpose,” Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. Envtl. Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324,
1330 (Wyo. 1979), but the agency need not discuss “every item or factor or opinion in the submissions
made to it,” SCHWARTZ, supra note 172, at 200-01.
266 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing reviewing courts to “set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law”).
267 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (emphasizing that an agency must set
forth the basis for each rule “with such clarity as to be understandable”); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983) (“We have frequently reiterated that
an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner . . . .”).
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Under the leading formulation of [the hard look] doctrine, “the agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the
choices made.’” The court “consider[s] whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment.” In addition, the agency may not “entirely fail[] to consider an
important aspect of the problem,” may not “offer[] an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,” nor offer an
explanation that is “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise.” The agency must also relate the
factual findings and expected effects of the regulation to the purposes or goals
the agency must consider under the statute as well as respond to salient
criticisms of the agency’s reasoning.268

Note that the hard look standard does not require an agency to
demonstrate a “compelling” state interest nor does it allow a court to second
guess executive choices among alternatives; thus, it is not as demanding as
strict scrutiny analysis. But, just as clearly, hard look analysis is not equivalent
to the minimal rationality review applicable in cases involving economic
legislation.269 Rather, it is meant to endorse a tougher stance, perhaps akin to
the constitutional standard known as “rationality with bite,”270 on the ground
that executive agents are not popularly elected or imbued with supreme
legislative authority, but rather appointed officials who are restrained by
legislative policy.271
Thus, the hard look standard stands in stark contrast to the Court’s
current “soft look” special needs jurisprudence. As applied to panvasive
searches and seizures, hard look doctrine would be less deferential to
government programs because it would require a greater demonstration of
effectiveness at crime reduction than the Court’s special needs cases do. For
instance, the drug testing program of customs agents upheld in Von Raab
would have failed hard look analysis, because there was virtually no evidence
268 Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 378-79 (2012) (second,
third, and fourth alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
269 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1197 (2008) (“Traditional rational basis
review only asks whether any theoretical, or hypothesized, rational relationship exists to a legitimate
governmental interest; the challenger must essentially prove a negative by eliminating any real or
imagined basis for the enactment. By way of contrast, under ‘rationality with bite,’ the government
bears the burden of establishing the actual reason for the law that would be advanced by applying
the law . . . .”).
270 Id.
271 See Stack, supra note 268, at 379 (“Hard-look review further distinguishes regulations from
legislation; it has long been understood as requiring a higher standard of rationality than the
minimum rational basis standard of constitutional review.”).
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of a problem to be solved.272 A similar conclusion could easily have been
drawn with respect to at least one of the two school drug testing programs
addressed by the Court.273 Whether other panvasive actions discussed in Part
I would have survived a hard look is difficult to know, since the courts,
operating under the special needs rubric, have generally not demanded the
“relevant data” required under the doctrine. In general, however, judicial
pressure enforcing the hard look requirement should have the salutary effect
of moving police toward data- and evidence-based practices rather than
programs that rely on unsupported intuition.274
Were a court applying hard look analysis to examine the three programs
at issue here, it could justifiably ask for a written explanation of the crime
problems they are aimed at addressing and how they are meant to do so. New
York’s Domain Awareness System is touted as a much more efficient way of
facilitating communication of crime-relevant information to police in real
time, and also as a means of enhancing police safety by alerting officers to the
location and history of suspects.275 Fusion center repositories likewise make
information access and collation more efficient.276 The D.C. roadblock
272 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“What is absent in the Government’s justifications—notably absent, revealingly absent,
and as far as I am concerned dispositively absent—is the recitation of even a single instance in which
any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of
bribetaking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise of classified
information, was drug use.”).
273 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
849 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (indicating that drug use at the school was not a major problem
at this time); id. at 852-53 (noting that the targets of the program—students who engaged in
extracurricular activities—were less likely than the general student population to engage in drug
usage). Lower courts have occasionally been willing to rely on the Fourth Amendment to implement
the same objective. See, e.g., Lebron v. Sec. of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th
Cir. 2014) (holding that drug testing of Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) funds recipients
constituted an unreasonable search where there was no empirical showing that drug use concerns
were particularly strong for TANF applicants); Tannahill ex rel. Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch.
Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding unconstitutional a school district’s drug testing
policy where empirical evidence showed that drug use had not increased prior to adoption of policy
and was generally lower than in other schools in the state).
274 See Lawrence Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking,
42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 383-84 (2013) (defining “evidence-based policing” as “the use of best research
evidence on ‘what works’ as a guide to police decisions” and arguing that police need to move toward
evidence-based policing not only to improve efficacy but to increase legitimacy).
275 See Chris Francescani, NYPD Expands Surveillance Net to Fight Crime as Well as Terrorism,
REUTERS (June 21, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-ny-surveillance-idUSL2
N0EV0D220130621 [https://perma.cc/MHY5-HUUQ] (recounting how the system brings together
data from multiple technological sources and makes them available to the individual police officer).
276 See Fusion Center Success Stories, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/
fusion-center-success-stories [https://perma.cc/5DX7-4DZT] (describing the successes of fusion
centers, which state and local entities have established to improve information sharing and analysis
regarding a range of threats within their jurisdictions). But see Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
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program, probably the most controversial of the three when it was
implemented, was nonetheless conceived and justified (albeit ex post) as a
response to an increase in random, drive-by shootings in the Trinidad area of
the District.277 Thus, on the face of it, all three programs appear to have a
rational basis. But courts would not be remiss in asking for data supporting
these points.
Moreover, hard look analysis should not end with abstract assessments of
program rationales. Just as important is an evaluation of whether the
program, as implemented, is rationally aimed at achieving its objectives. If,
for instance, domain awareness and fusion center policies do not specify how
the information collected will be kept secure, screened for accuracy, and
accessed, they fail (quoting from Stack’s explanation) “to consider an
important aspect of the problem.”278
Agency deployment of its panvasive resources must be rational as well.
For instance, some applications of domain awareness technology are meant
to help police focus their presence in “hot spots” that are thought to be
particularly prone to crime.279 But suppose the police department chooses to
flood with cops only some of the zones designated as hot, and those spots
happen to be heavily populated by people of color.280 The D.C. roadblock
program ended up affecting only the Trinidad area, which consisted primarily
of residences owned by poor African Americans.281 In such situations, hard
look review leads to a third inquiry, which can help uncover biased, capricious,
or pretextual programs.

Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1444
(2011) (noting that “[y]ears after they were initiated, advocates of fusion centers have failed to give
more than a cursory account of the benefits they provide”).
277 See Glod, supra note 245 (quoting the District of Columbia Attorney General as saying that
the roadblock “was effective” because “[p]eople were coming in, using cars to shoot the place up and
then escaping in their vehicles”).
278 Stack, supra note 268, at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
605 (1977) (explaining that “[t]he right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures”).
279 See How to Identify Hot Spots, NAT’L INST. JUST. (May 25, 2010), http://nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/strategies/hot-spot-policing/pages/identifying.aspx [https://perma.cc/D5CW-V55E]
(describing the use of Geographic Information Systems “to more accurately pinpoint hot spots to
confirm trouble areas, identify the specific nature of the activity occurring within the hot spot and
then develop strategies to respond”).
280 Cf. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance and Race in the New Policing,
42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 52-53) (on file with author) (finding
that, despite the use of data-based policing methods in Boston, black suspects are more likely than
white suspects to be observed, interrogated, and frisked, controlling for gang membership and prior
arrest history).
281 Glod, supra note 245.
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C. Implementation of the Policy
Once a rule is promulgated, the APA says nothing about how it should be
carried out, apparently because implementation is considered a form of
informal adjudication for which the APA has not developed standards. Here,
however, the logic of administrative law, consistent with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, dictates that agency actions be performed in a “regularized”
fashion; as formulated by one commentary, “It is firmly established that an
agency’s unjustified discriminatory treatment of similarly situated parties
constitutes arbitrary and capricious agency action.”282 Thus, courts have held
that, unless the rationale for the rule signals a different result, all potential
targets of a program should be treated in the same manner.283
In its inspection, checkpoint, and drug testing cases, the Court has often
insisted on this evenhanded implementation requirement, citing the Fourth
Amendment but also referencing, explicitly or implicitly, administrative
regimes.284 Accordingly, checkpoints, drug testing programs, inspection
plans, data collection systems, and other panvasive actions must be
implemented in a way that minimizes or eliminates discretion through either
universal or random application of the program to those intended to be
affected by it. Allowing police on the beat to decide who has “legitimate”
business within a neighborhood, as occurred in the D.C. roadblock
program,285 would violate this precept, as would the drug testing policy
invalidated in Ferguson, which did not apply to all pregnant women but only
those who had no, late, or incomplete prenatal care, “[p]reterm labor ‘of no
obvious cause,’” or “[p]reviously known drug or alcohol abuse.”286 Application
of these types of criteria changes a panvasive search and seizure into a
suspicion-based one, where traditional normal Fourth Amendment doctrine
282 Joseph T. Small, Jr. & Robert A. Burgoyne, Criminal Prosecutions Initiated by Administrative
Agencies: the FDA, the Accardi Doctrine and the Requirement of Consistent Agency Treatment, 78 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 87, 103-04 (1987).
283 See, e.g., Green Country Mobilephone, Inc. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“We
reverse the Commission not because the strict rule it applied is inherently invalid, but rather because
the Commission has invoked the rule inconsistently. We find that the Commission has not treated
similar cases similarly.”); Crestline Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1982)
(noting that the NLRB “cannot treat similar situations in dissimilar ways” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Burinskas v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966))); Contractors Transp.
Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1976) (explaining that “[p]atently inconsistent
application of agency standards to similar situations lacks rationality” and is prohibited under the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard); Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 517 F.2d
761, 765 (1st Cir. 1975) (“[An administrative agency] has a duty to define and apply its policies in a
minimally responsible and evenhanded way.”).
284 See supra Part I.
285 See Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d, 571 F.3d 1304
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
286 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71 n.4 (2001).
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should govern. The inspection program in Burger might have flunked for this
reason as well: the program was apparently implemented in a highly
scattershot manner.287
The evenhandedness requirement goes well beyond ensuring that a
particular program is carried out in a nondiscriminatory fashion, however.
Agencies must also ensure that the program, as defined, does not irrationally
fixate on a particular area or group; to use Stack’s formulation, “the factual
findings and expected effects of the regulation” must be related “to the
purposes or goals the agency must consider.”288 In effect, this aspect of hard
look analysis mimics disparate treatment doctrine,289 but without requiring
the usual predicate of race or religion. If it turns out that police cannot point
to solid evidence that the areas or groups subject to domain awareness,
records collection, or roadblocks are prone to more crime, the administrative
policy begins to look irrational.290 To avoid the potential for rejection under
the hard look standard, the ex ante differences in crime rates in these various
scenarios should be noticeable. Otherwise, the agency should apply the
program across the board to all similarly situated zones, groups, or
neighborhoods, or do so randomly.291
In short, hard look doctrine requires that, when carrying out panvasive
searches and seizures, police agencies provide a rationale for any distinctions
they make between places or groups of people. This requirement would redress
a problem that special needs jurisprudence—which evaluates panvasive actions
atomistically—leaves completely unregulated. Most importantly, it would
287 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 723 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Neither the
statute, nor any regulations, nor any regulatory body, provides limits or guidance on the selection of
vehicle dismantlers for inspection. . . . I conclude that ‘the frequency and purpose of the inspections
[are left] to the unchecked discretion of Government officers.’”).
288 Stack, supra note 268, at 378.
289 Disparate treatment occurs when “[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
290 Some courts confronting the placement of checkpoints have been willing to use the Fourth
Amendment to achieve this goal. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 727 N.Y.S.2d 881, 881 (App. Div. 2001)
(stating that “the People were obligated, inter alia, to demonstrate the gravity of the public concern
that would be served by the roadblock” and finding that the State did not meet its burden because,
“although the People’s witnesses testified that the relevant locality suffered from an increase in
various crimes, they offered only generalized assertions to support this claim”); see also State v.
Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988) (holding a sobriety checkpoint unconstitutional because there was
“no evidence of [a] basis for the site selection”); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1985)
(upholding a sobriety checkpoint plan developed after extensive research into locations within the
city where there had been DUI arrests and alcohol-related accidents).
291 See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 6, at 816 (“[R]andomized stops at suspicion-sufficient
checkpoints should be the focal point of Fourth Amendment reasonableness: randomized
engagement of citizens offers a better constitutional model for controlling the exercise of police
power against individuals.”).
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recognize that policing is redistributive.292 Police do not execute searches and
seizures in a vacuum; they choose where, when, and how they will deploy
their resources and, as a result, affect some localities and types of people more
than others. Today, these choices occur with little or no oversight. The result,
some allege, is that some communities unfairly bear the brunt of police
activity.293 Courts should have the authority to make sure that is not the case.
The hard look doctrine applies only to agency actions, not legislation. But
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the evenhanded implementation
requirement should apply even when the panvasive policy is dictated by
statute rather than agency policy. For instance, the registry inspection scheme
in Patel was explicitly authorized by a legislature,294 an entity that need not
explain itself in the way an agency must. Nonetheless, the statute was
unconstitutional because, the Supreme Court implied, it permitted
nonconsensual searches of a hotel registry on the whim of the police;295 in
practice, the law permitted police to ignore some hotels entirely but choose
to search others every day. Because the statute set out no neutral inspection
plan, police searches under it resembled a suspicion-based search without the
requisite suspicion.
D. Legislative Authorization and Oversight
This latter point leads to a final important attribute of administrative law.
A predicate to administrative rulemaking is that legislation authorizes the
agency action about which rules are made.296 Sometimes, as in Patel, the
legislation directly mandates the action. Usually, however, the statute sets out
a general directive that the agency must implement more precisely through
its own policies. If an agency generates a rule, it must be consistent with its
statutory delegation.297 Any agency rule that is ultra vires is void.
292 See Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1173
(2012) (“[C]ourts and scholars should conceptualize arrests, and proactive policing more generally,
as a distributive good.”); see also Miller, supra note 253, at 525 (“[P]olicing presents (in addition to
the usual procedural and corrective issues) a problem of distributive justice. The distributive issue
addresses the differential imposition of the benefits and burdens of policing across different
communities and localities.”).
293 See Sekhon, supra note 292, at 1211 (“In proactive policing, police departments have
considerable discretion to ration arrests as they see fit. These departmental choices generate winners
and losers, with significant distributive consequences.”).
294 See L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.49(2)–(4) (2015).
295 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2456 (2015) (holding that the statute “is
also constitutionally deficient . . . because it fails sufficiently to constrain police officers’ discretion
as to which hotels to search and under what circumstances”).
296 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 172, § 4.4, at 171 (“The statute is the source of agency authority
as well as of its limits. If an agency act is within the statutory limits (or vires), its action is valid; if
it is outside them (or ultra vires), it is invalid.”).
297 Id. § 4.4, at 172.
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This principle could have significant implications for panvasive searches
and seizures because a large number of such programs are not explicitly
authorized by legislation. For instance, drug testing programs like the one in
Skinner, sobriety checkpoints like those in Sitz, and surveillance systems like
New York’s Domain Awareness System are, at best, grounded on omnibus
statutory delegations of law enforcement powers.298 Similarly, fusion centers
often operate without any explicit statutory authority;299 thus there is no
legislative directive as to the types of information they can collect, the length of
time they may maintain it, or the types of wrongdoing they can attempt to detect
with the information collected. In an administrative paradigm, courts might well
conclude that a more specific legislative mandate is required when government
action is so significant in scope and involves such sensitive information.300
Of course, at the federal level, the Supreme Court has indicated that, at
most, legislation need only set out a vague “intelligible principle” to guide
agencies.301 But if the only relevant legislative pronouncement is “to enforce
298 The drug testing policy in Skinner was promulgated under the Federal Railroad Safety Act
of 1970, which simply states that the Secretary of Transportation is to “prescribe, as necessary,
appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety.” Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1976)). The sobriety
checkpoint in Sitz was triggered by a gubernatorial request over legislative opposition. Sitz v. Dep’t
of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Mich. Dep’t of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). The New York City Domain Awareness System was based on the
authority of chapter 18, section 435(a) of the New York City Charter, which states that police shall
“preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs and
insurrections, disperse unlawful or dangerous assemblages . . . ; protect the rights of persons and
property, guard the public health, [and] preserve order[;] . . . regulate, direct, control and restrict the
movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic for the facilitation of traffic and the convenience of the
public as well as the proper protection of human life and health . . . ; inspect and observe all places of
public amusement [and] all places of business . . . [; and] enforce and prevent the violation of all laws
and ordinances in force in the city; and for these purposes to arrest all persons guilty of violating any
law or ordinance for the suppression or punishment of crimes or offenses.” N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 18,
§ 435(a) (2004).
299 See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 243, at 6 (stating that fusion centers “derive
their authority from general statutes creating state police agencies or memoranda of understanding
among partner agencies”); see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 276, at 1453-55 (discussing
“confusing lines of authority” with respect to fusion centers).
300 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1844 (“As compared with the regulation
of almost any other aspect of society that fundamentally affects the rights and liberties of the people,
rules adopted by democratic bodies to govern policing tend to be few and far between.”).
301 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). The Court
has struck down only two statutes on nondelegation grounds, “one of which provided literally no
guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the
entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring
‘fair competition.’” Id. at 474. The first statute found to be “unintelligible” required that the agency
act in the “public interest,” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-27 (1943), and the
second ordered the agency to regulate in a “fair and equitable” manner, Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 420, 447 (1944).
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the criminal law,”302 even that vacuous mandate might not be met. It is also
worth noting that the nondelegation doctrine—which is the genesis of the
intelligible principle requirement—is frequently much more robust in the
states than it is at the federal level.303 Thus, for instance, one state court has
held that the nondelegation doctrine “requires that the legislature, in delegating
its authority provide sufficient identification of the following: (1) The persons
and activities potentially subject to regulation; (2) the harm sought to be
prevented; and (3) the general means intended to be available to the
administrator to prevent the identified harm.”304
As this language suggests, taken seriously the nondelegation doctrine
would force the relevant legislature to be specific in authorizing panvasive
actions. The legislating body would have to endorse in a statute the use of
cameras and license plate recognition systems necessary to carry out the domain
program, the collection of information from financial and communications
entities that occurs within fusion centers, and the detentions that occur at
neighborhood checkpoints aimed at fighting violence;305 likewise with other
types of panvasive actions, such as sobriety checkpoints, drug testing of school
children, and DNA testing. Forcing these issues to be debated at the highest
policy level ensures democratic accountability.306
Just as importantly, a specific legislative directive identifying the “persons
or activities” sought to be regulated, the “harm” to be prevented, and the
“means” of prevention would provide crucial guidance for law enforcement in
panvasive cases, especially with respect to the first category: persons and
activities to be affected. If, for instance, the legislature authorizes drug testing
of school children, the principle of evenhanded application would require
testing of every child in the jurisdiction or, in the alternative, a random subset
of that group or a subset of that group that is demonstrably more likely to be
involved in illegal drug use. The legislative provision would define the group
302 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1844 (noting that “[t]he typical enabling
statute of a policing agency simply authorizes it to enforce the substantive criminal law—but says little
or nothing about what enforcement actions police are permitted to take”).
303 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers
Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (1999) (“In many states, courts impose substantive
limits on delegation. Legislatures are not allowed to delegate to agencies unless they have articulated
reviewable standards to guide agency discretion, even where procedural safeguards are in place.”).
304 Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co., 369 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ill. 1977).
305 See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic
Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2010) (arguing that
“delegations lacking intelligible principles are often less deserving of judicial deference because the
resulting policies lack the political authority that typically underlies the rationale for the deference
in the first place”).
306 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1875 (asserting that “democratic review
[not judicial review] is what is necessary to strike the policy balance that rests at the bottom of
policing decisions”).
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to be subjected to the panvasive action, which would force both the legislature
and the law enforcement agency to consider and be clear about the stakes
involved and cabin the agency’s discretion.
A final observation on the legislature’s role has to do with oversight.
Enforcement of legislative directives has usually been left to the courts and
the agencies themselves. However, Congress has occasionally created other
agency-oversight mechanisms. For instance, Congress has required that all
major agency actions be subject to cost–benefit analysis by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs.307 Other statutes set up legislative
oversight committees for particular agency actions, such as those involving
national security surveillance.308 While such oversight is not required as a
first principle of administrative law, it might be a factor that a reviewing court
considers in weighing whether a police agency has been sufficiently attentive
to effectiveness and other policy considerations in establishing a search or
seizure program.309
E. Future Directions
The goal of this Article is to give teeth to the new administrativist
approach to police regulation. The essential claim is that, given their
legislative nature, panvasive actions not only should, but must, be governed
by administrative law principles. These principles would improve democratic
accountability and counter the usual law enforcement orientation of
legislative bodies by requiring public input prior to implementation, agency
rationalization of the program, implementation that is both consistent with
the stated rationale and evenhandedly carried out, and legislative
authorization that is sufficiently specific to satisfy a court that a representative
body considers the program permissible. Finally, these principles apply
regardless of whether the courts have formally designated a particular type of
panvasive action a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
For one who is persuaded by these points, a cause for concern is that the
entire scheme is dependent on the whims of the legislature. Congress and
state legislatures, lobbied by police-oriented groups, could explicitly exempt
law enforcement agencies from the APA and the equivalent state

307 See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Who’s on First?: The Role of the Office of Management and Budget
in Federal Information Policy, 10 J. LEGIS. 95, 115 (1983) (noting that Congress delegated responsibility
for the Paperwork Reduction Act to OIRA, which gave the office “important management powers”).
308 See Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 289, 316-25 (2015) (describing the Federal Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board).
309 Berger, supra note 305, at 52-53 (discussing the importance of oversight and the weight it
should receive in reviewing delegations to agencies).
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administrative procedure statutes.310 The question then becomes whether the
Fourth Amendment or, as Davis argued years ago,311 the Due Process Clause
would nonetheless require that some version of these principles apply.
Certainly the notice and rationality requirements outlined here could be seen
as aspects of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. But further
elaboration of that point is left for future inquiry, as is the extent to which
the exclusionary rule, rather than the usual administrative remedy of
enjoining a flawed program, is appropriate in this setting.312
Also left for later work is whether these same precepts ought to apply to
other aspects of police work. This Article has distinguished panvasive and
suspicion-based actions on the ground that only the former type of policing
is sufficiently legislative in nature to mandate application of traditional
administrative law principles. But that distinction may at most exempt from
administrative purview the decision to stop, arrest, or search a particular
person. While that decision is akin to an adjudication, the methods police use
to carry out stops, arrests, and searches are closer to legislative rules. For
instance, the force used to effect a detention, the protocol for communicating
with the targets of a search, and the use of body cameras are all issues that
can easily be dealt with prospectively. Like the panvasive actions discussed in
this Article, these methodological matters clearly affect the “rights” of citizens.
The key question is whether they are sufficiently distant from “internal” or
“interpretive” concerns to be subject to written policies that are developed after
public input, bolstered by written justifications, and subject to judicial review.
Ironically, the focal point of Professor Davis’s seminal scholarship—the
decision about whom to stop, arrest, and search once the requisite cause is
established—is the type of police work that sits least comfortably with current
administrative law requirements. The mismatch is compounded by the
unavailability of an obvious remedy in such situations. The administrative law
remedy for failure to devise a rule, follow the appropriate rulemaking process,
310 In Florida, for instance, the state APA exempts law enforcement policies and procedures
which relate to “[t]he collection, management, and dissemination of active criminal intelligence
information and active criminal investigative information; management of criminal investigations;
and . . . [s]urveillance techniques, the selection of surveillance personnel, and electronic
surveillance, including court-ordered and consensual interceptions of communication.” FLA. STAT.
§ 120.80(6)(a)–(c) (2016).
311 See supra text accompanying notes 174–75.
312 On the exclusionary rule issue, my tentative preference is to use exclusion as a deterrent to
pretextual use of panvasive actions, but otherwise to rely on equitable remedies. See Slobogin, supra
note 3, at 142-43. Thus, drugs found during a license checkpoint stop would be inadmissible even if
the checkpoint is legitimate, but drugs found during a narcotics checkpoint would not be, whether
or not the checkpoint is valid as a matter of administrative law. As the Supreme Court said in United
States v. Caceres, “we cannot ignore the possibility that a rigid application of an exclusionary rule to
every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation of additional
standards to govern prosecutorial and police procedures.” 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979).
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or implement a rule evenhandedly is to enjoin the administrative action.313
That remedy works when the challenge is to a policy authorizing a panvasive
action; once chastised by a court, the police agency must simply go back to
the drawing board. But when the challenge is to a failure to follow a selective
enforcement rule, the analogous remedy would be dismissal of charges, which
will strike most as overkill, especially when the police action is in fact based
on probable cause or meets other Fourth Amendment requirements.314 None
of this means that selective enforcement decisions would not benefit from
development of administrative rules as well. But even if regulation of that part
of police work is left to the Fourth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause,
and the substantive criminal law, a significant amount of police conduct beyond
panvasive actions might still be subject to administrative law principles.
CONCLUSION
Searches and seizures of groups have proven to be a major challenge for
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The traditional requirement of
individualized suspicion, if rigorously applied, would spell the end of all
panvasive searches and seizures, even those that most would agree are
effective and minimally intrusive. But foregoing all regulation of panvasive
actions creates a huge potential for abuse, akin to that associated with the
dreaded general warrant, especially as modern policing increasingly moves in
the direction of mass surveillance and other technologically driven programs
such as DNA testing. The Supreme Court’s attempt to mediate this tension
through its special needs doctrine is incoherent and overly deferential. The
strict scrutiny alternative proposed by many commentators errs too far in the
other direction, and sends courts into thickets best reserved for the legislative
and administrative processes.
This Article has argued that, given the administrative nature of panvasive
searches and seizures, the courts should turn to administrative law in this
setting. Both Supreme Court precedent and the rule-like structure of
panvasive actions support such an approach. A regulatory regime based on
administrative law principles would hold law enforcement agencies more
accountable to legislatures, the public, and the courts than does the Court’s
special needs doctrine, but would avoid subjecting departmental decisions to
detailed second-guessing by the judiciary. In short, police agencies should be
313 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990) (involving a suit to enjoin the operation of a sobriety checkpoint that would
result in the arrest of drivers found to be drunk).
314 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1904-05 (recognizing this problem).
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treated like other agencies. While still granted significant deference, police
agencies, like other agencies, would be required to seek public input before
enacting search and seizure programs, provide reasons for their decisions, act
consistently with those reasons, and distribute policing power evenly within
the scope of legislative mandates. That combination of restrictions, enforced
by the courts, would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s central
goal—embodied in its reasonableness requirement—of limiting government
discretion, without imposing impossible or difficult-to-decipher burdens on
either the executive or judicial branches.

